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The central objective of this dissertation is to study the relationship 
between reproductive rights and population policies, at an international level and 
within national contexts. 
My dissertation research achieved this general goal in three ways. First, I 
offer a theoretical intervention in the contemporary debate about human rights; on 
their global need, validity, universality, and foundations. Second, I generate an 
analytical proposal for the study of reproductive rights as an international 
discourse and as a group of normative standards within nations. Third, I develop 
an application of the analytical framework to the case of contemporary Mexico. 
In chapter one, I evaluate the virtues and problems of the contemporary 
discourse on human rights in light of the debate between critical theorists, 
 vii 
communitarians and liberal philosophers about the possibility of universal moral 
judgment. 
Situated within that theoretical debate, in chapter two I analyze the social 
and normative meaning of reproductive rights. I also offer a sociological 
interpretation of the relationship, as well as the conflicts and tensions, that emerge 
between the enforcement of population policies of nation states and the rights of 
citizens to decide over their bodies and reproduction. My intention is to advance 
an analytical proposal for the study of reproductive rights within the social and 
political dynamics of specific countries. 
In chapter three, in turn, I examine contemporary Mexico (since the 
1970s) as an empirical case where the enforcement of population policies by 
governmental institutions has resulted in authoritarian practices that have violated 
the rights of Mexican citizens, despite its liberal constitution and legislation, and 
the emergence of civil organizations promoting the defense of reproductive rights 
in the country.  
Finally, this dissertation belongs to the current tradition of critical theory. 
It is informed by Habermas' theory of communicative action, and benefits from 
the insights of both the debate on discourse ethics, and on deliberative democracy. 
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The main goal of this dissertation is to study the relationship between 
reproductive rights and population policies, both in the dimension of international 
discourse and within the social dynamics of national contexts. This general goal 
was developed by way of three interlocking parts. First, I offer a theoretical 
intervention in the contemporary debate of human rights; on their global need, 
validity, universality, and foundations. Second, I produce an analytical proposal 
for the study of reproductive rights as an international discourse and as a group of 
normative standards within nations. Third, I use this analytical framework and 
apply it to study the case of contemporary Mexico.  
I would situate this dissertation project within the current tradition of 
critical theory. It is informed by Habermas' theory of communicative action 
(chapters one and two), and benefits from the insights of both the debate on 
discourse ethics (chapter one), and on deliberative democracy (chapters one, two, 
and three). 
In chapter one, I explore the contemporary debate on the philosophical 
status of human rights and the moral claim to their universality. Are human rights 
universal? Do human rights have philosophical foundations? Does the claim to 
universality come from the presence or absence of foundations? Do we need 
convincing and solid foundations in order to be able to claim that human rights 
are universal? Are there alternative sources for establishing human rights as 
universal normative standards? Or by contrast, is the question about universality 
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and philosophical foundations even relevant or useful? Should we abandon the 
whole debate about foundations and accept the political and practical fact that 
what human rights require is not theoretical reflection but ideological conviction 
and political action? Should we establish their universality by way of a practical 
agreement with legal power and focus our energies instead on their expansion, 
protection, and enforcement? 
The exploration of the problems and the debate about foundations and 
universality will lead me to argue that the proceduralist and multidimensional 
perspective of discourse ethics (in the tradition of critical theory) offers important 
insights and alternatives to both of these problems. 
I identify two additional problems that hamper the universal capacity of 
human rights: social inequality and the institutional conditions of the United 
Nations. 
Despite the explicit efforts to abstract and lift social inequality from the 
definition and process of entitlement1, I argue that all basic forms of social 
inequality actually constitute counter-universal forces that are built into the social 
context of nations, and thus sociologically predate international entitlement and 
the actualization of human rights. Furthermore, it is highly problematic to assume 
that it is enough to abstract them from their formal definition to rid all social 
processes of entitlement and actualization from the destructive and unjust forces 
of inequality. 
                                                 
    1 "Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property birth or other status ... " (Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948, Robertson, 1999, Appendix B). 
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I end the chapter by arguing for the need of a critique of the institutional 
operation, and of the system of differential powers among nation members as 
crucial obstacles for the democratic formation of international agreements and 
accords. 
Reproductive rights belong to the group of human rights that are by 
definition "social", that is that they require certain conditions and provisions from 
nation states in order for their citizens to be able to exercise them. This 
dependency on state action creates a unique set of political conditions and power 
relations that I believe need to be not only acknowledged, but carefully analyzed. 
In chapter two, I study the international definition of reproductive rights 
and its concurrent discourse. Throughout the chapter I develop a normative 
reading and a sociological interpretation of the process of making reproductive 
decisions. The general goal is to offer an analytical and interpretative framework 
for the study of reproductive rights in specific national contexts. 
I start by examining the two main components that define reproductive 
rights. First, I introduce an interpretation of the process of human reproduction 
and signal the segments that have become the basis for the construction of the 
normative discourse. Second, I explore the sociological and political significance, 
as well as the implications that these rights have been defined as "social rights", 
that is rights that imply a certain type of relationship between nation states and 
their citizens. Third, I identify two contentious issues in the history of their 
definition: entitlement and responsibility. While the debate around entitlement has 
allowed for the emergence of a thoughtful and more refined definition, the 
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problem with the concept of responsibility that qualifies these rights remains, in 
my estimation, largely unresolved and politically problematic for citizens, 
because it formally allows for discretionary intervention from states. 
Next, I move to the analysis of the assumptions that are embedded in the 
current international definition of reproductive rights. There are a series of 
assumptions that can be derived and made explicit from the definition and its 
historical development. However, there are others that are not easily derived and 
thus have remained basically implicit and unthematized. Yet these are not 
secondary. I contend that these sets of assumptions are fundamental for the 
exercise of reproductive rights, both in the private and public realms, and decisive 
for reproductive decision-making processes. 
What would be the ideal situation and process for making a reproductive 
decision? Taking Habermas' lead, I use the analytical intention of his "ideal 
speech situation" to produce an "ideal reproductive decision-making process." 
Informed by the standards of justice and equality suggested by contemporary 
human rights and feminist theory, I thematize the required elements, the key 
social relations, and the necessary conditions for an "ideal process." 
Having established the ideal normative, I turn my attention to the 
sociological dimension. Social structures and social relations represent a 
permanent jeopardy for the actualization of the ideal normative. I conclude by 
assessing the disturbances that the ideal reproductive decision-making process 
suffers when placed in contemporary societies; that is, within social contexts that 
are structured unequally, and where the prevailing form of social relations is 
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domination. For both the private and the public realms, I identify two main 
sources of disturbances: power relations and systems of social inequality. Finally, 
I examine the distortions these create to the ideal process; the constraints they 
impose over individuals and couples, as well as the effects they have on the 
process of formulating and carrying out reproductive decisions. 
Chapter three is an application of this framework and analytical proposal 
to the case of Mexico. Throughout the 20th century the Mexican state has defined 
the relationship between development and population growth in two radically 
different ways. First, population growth was conceived to be a source of national 
power and a requirement for economic growth and social development. To the 
extent of this definition, population growth was fostered and diverse policies were 
directly established to stimulate demographic growth or contribute to this goal. 
However, in the 1970s this conception was drastically changed, and the Mexican 
state moved from a position that stimulated population growth to one that 
controlled it. In fact, the state embraced a neo-Malthusian stance that now 
perceives population growth as a major obstacle for economic and social 
development. This change in the perception and definition of the impact of 
population growth over development was not only dramatic but most importantly 
it was enabled institutionally with a sense of urgency and a legal goal of 
permanence. With the full support of the Legislative branch of government, the 
Executive changed articles of the national constitution and introduced the General 
Law of Population. The new law not only explained the change in conception, but 
also created the institutional means for the translation of the spirit of the legal 
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transformations into specific policies. The new legal frame charged certain 
institutions for the design and others for the implementation of population 
policies. The goals were very clearly established: to regulate demographic 
phenomena in general, and to curtail the dynamics of growth while controlling 
fertility rates in particular. The General Law stipulates that these goals, however, 
should be pursued fully respecting the rights of Mexican citizens to decide the 
timing and number of children to have. 
Without the simultaneous processes of medicalization and 
institutionalization of reproduction in Mexico, it is hard to imagine how 
reproductive decisions would have been uprooted from the social space of the 
private realm and displaced to the public realm of medical knowledge, and of 
institutional and political actions. I trace and interpret central characteristics of 
these processes and their consequences for reproductive rights in contemporary 
Mexico. 
In the past three decades, a governmental and national family planning 
program has been the central tool for the implementation of fertility control 
policies in Mexico. I evalua te the impact that this program has had over fertility 
levels, as well as the institutional dimension of the provision of contraceptive 
services. Governmental medical institutions have been charged (by law and policy 
design) both with achieving fertility demographic goals and respecting the 
reproductive rights and decisions of individual citizens. 
Since its inception in 1973, the way of designing and enforcing fertility 
control policies has involved a large number of institutions, and a diverse range of 
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individuals and groups of governmental employees all committed to a common 
set of objectives and strategies. From a sociology of institutions perspective I 
analyze the mechanisms through which population policy is designed, planned, 
and executed. Given Mexico's contemporary history of semi-authoritarianism2 
both in its political system and its bureaucratic decision-making process, we 
should expect the area of population policies to follow the general patterns of 
political procedure and administrative practices. However, to what extent have 
fertility control policies, and the political procedures and administrative practices 
that set them in motion hindered and encroached upon the rights of citizens to 
determine their reproduction? 
 
                                                 
    2 A hybrid of a liberal constitution and legal framework, and authoritarian political practices and 
rule (Camp, 1999). 
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Chapter 1:  The Unfulfilled Universal Capacity of Human Rights: 
An Intervention in the Theoretical Debate 
1.1 INTRODUCTION: WHY THEORIZE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS? 
While the practical and political relevance of human rights is rarely 
disputed, and it is common to find extensive support for a global defense and 
protection of human rights, theoretical reflections are frequently rendered 
suspicious and theory development is questioned as an area of knowledge or field 
of research. The cry is all too familiar: Why theorize about human rights, when 
what we need is to double our efforts for their pervasive acceptance as normative 
standards, and to develop effective mechanisms to stop their violation and secure 
their extensive respect? 
In this chapter, however, I will defend not only the legitimacy of 
theoretical deliberation on human rights, but in addition the idea that theory 
development is essential for the possibility of human rights ever becoming 
international normative standards, and fundamental for crucial political decisions 
and actions that attempt to safeguard and empower individuals and groups all over 
the world. 
I start by offering a general definition of human rights and by identifying a 
series of conceptual links that, I believe, are fundamental to their contemporary 
use and interpretation (section 1.2).  
On the basis of that definition, the attention shifts to the question of 
foundations and universality. Do human rights have or need foundations? Is there 
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any legitimacy in the universal claim of human rights? As international normative 
standards, how universal can human rights be? Both the issue of foundations and 
that of universality are part of ongoing and unresolved current debates. First, I 
propose that the central axis of the contemporary debate on the philosophical 
foundations and the universality of human rights can be found in the possibilities 
and problems of universalizing moral judgments (section 1.3). Second, I argue for 
multidimensional interventions that simultaneously address the practical-political, 
substantive, and meta-ethical spheres of the problem, as a way of moving forward 
in current debates about human rights (sections 1.4 and 1.5). 
Finally, using a sociology of institutions perspective and a deliberative 
model of democracy, I analyze the United Nations as an institut ion with global 
qualities and explore what I have identified as the unfulfilled universal capacity of 
contemporary human rights. I argue that while the United Nations is a unique and 
privileged social space within which global agreements can be reached, it is 
crucial to recognize that its undemocratic and non-deliberative institutional 
system and arrangement constitutes a paramount hindrance to the legitimacy of 
agreements, and to the universal claim of human rights as international normative 
standards of social and political behavior (section 1.6). 
Although not always explicit, the arguments of this chapter have been 
constructed through a dialogue and debate with the theses and interpretations of 
two authors: Noberto Bobbio (1990) and Michael Freeman (1994). 
In spite of the differences in analysis and forms of argumentation, both 
Bobbio and Freeman coincide that theoretical deliberation and research is of 
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crucial importance, especially in light of the normative and political consequences 
of cultural relativism. I strongly support and will argue this position throughout 
this chapter. 
However, the great separation happens when addressing the issue of 
foundations and universality. While Bobbio's forceful attack of research that 
attempts to find an absolute foundation for human rights, is largely compatible 
with Freeman's criticism of foundationalism without epistemological grounding, 
and with the critique I level against the monological and non-deliberative 
rationality of essentialism, the resolution he proposes –I believe– is not very 
convincing. Bobbio contends that "the fundamental problem of human rights 
today is not so much how to justify them but how to protect them. It is not a 
philosophical problem, but a political one" (1990, p.61). And although Bobbio 
ends up advocating a philosophical work informed by the "historical and social 
sciences", his solution would represent for Freeman (and I would coincide) a 
delicate abandonment of the philosophical debate; leaving the terrain wide open 
to a fight between relativists and foundationalists (or essentialists). 
The position that Freeman holds, which I also defend in this chapter, is 
that the difficulties and contentions of the contemporary debate about the 
philosophical foundations of human rights do not justify abandoning that sphere 
of discussion and research. On the contrary, what is required are interventions 
capable of questioning approaches and paradigms, and perhaps suggesting new 
routes of analysis and deliberation. For Freeman, however, the basic clues can 
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come from accepting the challenge of philosophical anthropology, but 
reformulating it from a historical and epistemological perspective. 
There is a tension in contemporary philosophy between the concept of 
universal human rights and that of moral pluralism. If rights are grounded 
in interests and interests are grounded in ultimate values which are not 
rationally decidable, then rights are subject to disagreements that are not 
rationally decidable. Human rights then can have foundations. The 
foundations for human rights cannot, however, be superior to all rival 
means of reason (1994, p.513-14). 
Although much more elaborate than Bobbio's solution, I do not find 
Freeman's alternative persuasive, for his restricted definition of rationality isolates 
values from rational argumentation, discussion, and debate. From this definition, 
rationality only pertains to the sphere of interests. Therefore, a moral point of 
view is something that is held outside the realm of rational argumentation and on 
the basis of values that cannot be decided in this way. While Freeman strongly 
upholds theorizing human rights, his grounding proposal represents, in effect, an 
abandonment of an entire area of theoretical research, which is the development 
of theory in the moral and normative sphere of rationality. 
In contrast, my position (following Habermas and Benhabib) uses a more 
comprehensive model of rationality, and starts by assuming a strong connection 
between values and norms3. Likewise, and specifically for human rights I suggest 
that orienting values, moral judgments, and normative proposals not only can be 
subjected to rational analysis and debate, but should be constructed and always 
defined as open to critique, and deliberation. Furthermore, these deliberations 
need to be public, collective and take place within a context that can assure 
                                                 
     3 See Habermas (1984), Chapter I, sections 1 & 3, as well as Benhabib (1992), Chapters 1 & 2. 
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reaching reasonable agreements between free and equal participants, if 
contemporary human rights can ever realize its claims to universality and 
international legitimacy. 
1.2 DEFINING THE POINT OF DEPARTURE 
From a conceptual perspective, human rights can be analyzed through two 
theoretical dimensions: as an individualization of the social domain and as a 
moral reference for social relations.  
The conceptual terrain of human rights is that of the relationships that are 
established or can potentially be established between civil societies and their 
corresponding nation states. Their social and political meaning is directly related 
to the capabilities that individuals have, as members of a given civil society, to 
defend themselves from the operation and actions of the state. They are, to say it 
somehow, a permanent universal gaze, a moral regulator that national states are 
acting satisfying not only the needs of the majority, but respecting the integrity 
and the specific existence of minorities and all individuals, regardless of their 
political affiliation, social condition, and specific power. From a supra-morality 
that is designed and has life at an international level, it is translated into national 
moralities that are incorporated in the legal frameworks of each nation, in 
accordance to the different constitutions and conceptions about justice that are 
predominant, to the different forms in which political power is regulated and 
exercised, and to the real way in which politics is orchestrated and developed. 
On the one hand, to speak of human rights is to speak of the realm of 
particularity or, better still, of the particularization of civil phenomena. All and 
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each one of the individuals that compose a society are constituent and count as 
people, as individuals embodied with specific necessities and endowed with 
rights. In a population, the respect of those rights and the consideration of those 
necessities lead inevitably to the particularization of social action, to the 
individualization of social beings. It is in this sense that unique events matter, 
even those that are lived in isolation, in confinement or hidden away from the 
public gaze. All events acquire social relevance if they jeopardize the integrity of 
individuals or represent the negation of the individual self of a human being. 
What makes the events socially legitimate concerns are not their statistical weight 
or if they can be argued to be the consequences of a pattern of social behavior, but 
the fact that some action, organized or not, foreseen or accidental would imply, 
signify, or result in the negation of the essential rights or of the possibility of their 
unrestrained exercise. 
On the other hand, human rights have a moral dimension with two 
meanings: one that is abstract and the other that is practical. As an abstract 
morality they signal and point towards an ontological condition, that is to say, to 
the condition of being and not of existing or of acquiring. In that sense, they 
appear as a non-temporal and eternal quality. It is from this abstract morality that 
it can be said that every individual for the simple and basic reason of being human 
is automatically endowed with a series of inalienable rights. The state of being 
human is condition enough and the only requirement for the entitlement of rights. 
The adjective "human" is a double claim to universality: through membership to 
the community of humankind and through the recognition that the membership to 
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that community is based solely on individuality. In this way, the abstract 
dimension of morality universalizes human existence; humanity becomes an 
inclusive totality, a quality shared by all human beings. In this moral dimension, it 
is this potential for universality of the human condition what is named and 
qualified, what is conserved and defended. 
As a practical morality, human rights represent a great universal 
agreement, specified as a series of maxims, which establish the minimum 
parameters of the normative regulation of the social relationship between national 
states and their populations. They appear as a discourse that seeks to be 
constituted, by recognition and world consensus, as the central spirit and criteria 
for interpreting the actions and responsibilities of states, and as a guide for 
governmental procedures and policy implementation of nation states, regardless 
of the political system that has been adopted or is prevalent in each country. In 
this sense, they are constructed with the capacity to sanction and evaluate state 
performance as appropriate or inappropriate, as reasonable or unfounded, and to 
denounce whenever it results in the infringement of the rights of particular 
individuals and of groups of individuals that are constitutive of civil society. 
At this level, the questions that are trying to be answered are: How can we 
guarantee that even in the most remote part of the planet the rights of all human 
beings are fully recognized? How can we assure that the rights of all human 
beings will be respected at all times? Practical morality, therefore, concentrates on 
the unfolding of the abstract precepts into legal forms of regulation and 
accountability. The possibility of translating universal frameworks into specific 
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laws and regulations can be conceived as the transition from an agreement of 
good will to the foundation of a practical will, where it is possible to create 
concrete legal and political instruments able to assure the unconditional respect of 
rights at all levels and dimensions. Practical morality is fundamentally translation 
of abstract morality; it is legal and political reason. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights elaborated by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and proclaimed toward the year of 1948 (only 
two years after the end of the Second World War), constitutes the most complete 
and contemporary form of that practical morality. 
No matter how one chooses to define human rights, they always appear to 
be the social product of three interconnected processes: entitlement, recognition, 
and exercise. The concept of human rights always implies social relationships, 
because it requires of three interconnected processes: the process through which 
entitlement is made possible, the process through which entitlement is recognized, 
and the process that enables the exercise of those rights to which every individual 
is entitled and that are socially recognized. These processes reveal, however, 
interesting contradictions. While entitlement is a process that occurs at an 
international and discursive level, recognition combines the power of international 
organizations and the power of the nation state. Without a certain level of 
congruency between these two levels of power, recognition does not happen. 
Exercise, in turn, presupposes entitlement, and requires recognition but it is 
always dependent on the specific national context, on the patterns of the 
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distribution of wealth, and the systems of social inequality that structure social 
relations within those contexts.  
1.3 GROUNDING HUMAN RIGHTS : UNIVERSALITY AND FOUNDATIONS 
1.3.1 The Problem of Universality 
As an idea, natural rights precede human rights. The history of the human 
rights, in that sense, cannot obviate the history of the idea of natural rights. The 
first coherent and complete formulation of natural rights is as old as the own 
formulation of natural law in Greek philosophy and Roman jurisprudence. But 
that the concept of natural rights was not born with modernity, does not imply that 
its conceptualization in antiquity would have essentially the same content and 
jurisprudential importance of the proposals that emerged during the Renaissance 
and were consolidated during the Enlightenment. It is only under a modern 
interpretation that natural rights become human rights (Freeman, 1994; Palumbo, 
1982; Robertson, 1999). 
A theoretical reconstruction of the concept of human rights, then, would 
entail going back to the own history of the idea of natural rights, and would be 
confronted with at least two possible starting points. The first one could find the 
elementary origins in old Greek thought and in the emergence of Roman 
jurisprudence. It would probably imply a detailed analysis of the thought of the 
Stoics, their place in the Hellenic period of Greek philosophy, their recovery of 
Plato and Aristotle's philosophy, and their particular interpretation of logos as a 
rational principle that governs the universe. Also, it would examine the significant 
conceptual and practical impact of stoicism on Rome, but in particular over the 
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ideas of rights, legislation, politics and literature, and its center role in the 
development of Roman philosophy of law (Minogue, 1979; Palumbo, 1982). 
The second starting point, in contrast, could trace the modern origins of 
human rights in the secular and humanist conceptions of the Renaissance and their 
definitive challenge to medieval conceptions and explanations of the world and 
social relations. The analysis could be centered on the process of the 
secularization of society and of thought that created the appropriate conditions to 
conceive new theoretical foundations for natural rights. This pervasive, profound, 
and radical process allowed, on the one hand, substituting the idea of a universal 
reason that organizes and governs everything (Stoic logos) for human reason as a 
principle for explanation and judgment, and on the other hand, the possibility of 
rejecting theology as a logic in legal argumentation and justification (Bobbio, 
1990; Freeman, 1994; Robertson, 1999). 
Whatever starting point one might decide to take in reconstructing the  
conceptual history of natural rights, it seems crucial to recognize the presence of 
three central elements: 1) that Greek and Roman stoicism played a founding role; 
2) that the Stoic conception of one universal governing idea was transformed into 
God and divine wisdom during the medieval period, and 3) that in the beginnings 
of modernity there was a paradigmatic change in the forms of conceptualizing and 
justifying the moral and legal dimensions of life. 
With the secularization of society and the decisive ruptures with old social 
cosmogonies, which occurred throughout the Renaissance and Reformation 
periods, the first chapters of classic liberal thought and of modernity as the origin 
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of a new concept of natural rights were written. It is on the basis of this process of 
deep ideological, cognitive and normative transformations that I find that the 
argument of a paradigmatic change can be sustained. 
I am referring, fundamentally, to the paradigmatic change that took place 
when the divine and God were substituted for the idea of Nature and of "naturally 
human" as fundamental sources of the rights of people. The source that provides 
human beings with rights to act, to obtain, to possess, to desire was moved from a 
celestial narrative to a worldly narrative, to a narrative that was no longer outside 
the reach of human will but one that appeared more mundane and accessible to 
humans. 
That paradigmatic change, however, did not only mean the substitution of 
one source of explanation for another, but it also implied a transformation of 
moral justification itself. When Divine Power constitutes the source of all rights, 
it is the interpretation of the word of God, and the translation of God’s will what 
ultimately renders life to the human condition. In contrast, when the source is 
identified in Nature and coming from the natural, historical, and social existence 
of individuals, when the source appears tangible and earthly, the definitive 
introduction of reason and logic, as conceptual procedure, will redefine 
completely the process of justification. 
Once the skies were lowered to the earth and theological reasoning was 
substituted for human reason, the concept of natural rights are to be explained and 
justified by searching for the essence of human beings, of humanity on Earth, and 
on the basis of the laws of human nature. After these profound transformations 
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took place the substantial problem for moral justification, for the explanation of 
entitlement and the distribution of benefits will depend on discovering the laws of 
human nature, history, and society. The emergence of the modern concept of 
rights is marked by this new rationality that is based on truth claims about the 
essence of humanity, society and history, and it is linked to the emergence of 
nation-states and the transformation of the political relationship between states 
and their citizens. 
According to Norberto Bobbio, the process can be explained by the 
 overturn in the relationship state-citizens, characteristic of the formation 
of the modern state: from the priority of the duties of subjects to the 
priority of citizen's rights, to the different way of looking at political 
relations, no longer prevailing from the sovereign's point of view, but 
prevailing from the citizen's point of view (1990, p.15). 
Human rights share with natural rights, civil rights and national rights the 
same cradle; they share the fact of being products of liberal thought and of having 
been developed at the same time of the unfolding of modernity, of the modern 
nation-state and in the context of the emergence and consolidation of capitalism 
(Hirschmann, 1992; Marshall, 1950; Turner, 1986, Van Gunsteren, 1978). At the 
same time, they share the same problems associated to the processes of moral 
justification, where the demand for universality becomes the center of the debate. 
The word "rights" has usually been partnered by an adjective that indicates 
the supposed source of the rights. In the early modern period, we find 
ourselves dealing with "natural" rights, and in more recent times it has 
become the practice to talk about "human" rights. The force of the word 
"human” here is to indicate that the rights in question are those we believe 
to be an essential part of a properly human life (Minogue, 1979, p.4-5). 
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The argument of Minogue directs our attention to the source of rights as 
the same attributes that provide not only a descriptor of the right, but rather 
defines its universal capacities. From this perspective, the source is defined by the 
basic condition of being a human being and the universal capacity of human 
rights will depend essentially on how boundless the definition of being a human 
is. In other words, if we were to find or discover the basic characteristics, the most 
fundamental qualities that define all human beings as such, we would be capable 
of proclaiming those as the universal foundations of human rights. This type of 
argumentation is known as foundationalist or essentialist because it presumes a 
centerpiece, a core, and an essence for all things, actions, and beings. From this 
perspective, the key of the reflective process is to be able to discover or determine 
this "essence". In order to argue for its universal existence, an "essence" that is 
boundless and therefore can transcend the specific contingencies of historical time 
and the contextual particularities of social space, has to be discovered or 
determined. 
Essentialism frequently appears opposed to forms of thought that are know 
as contextualists, because they offer partial and relative solutions to the problem 
of universality. Cranston's interpretation of the relation between rights and the 
implied morality in legal frames is a good example of this perspective. 
When we speak of a right we are not only talking about the facts of a 
positive legal system, and it is a distortion of language to pretend that is so. The 
word "right," by definition, means not only a "lawful entitlement," it also means a 
"just entitlement." We all of us speak of our moral rights as well as legal or 
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positive rights. Indeed, the most common use of the word "right" is both to make 
a claim and to assert, in making that claim, that one is morally entitled to do so 
(Cranston, 1979, p.19). 
The intention of tying the "legal" to the "just" suggests a reasoning that 
wants to argue that behind all systems of law there is always a concept of justice 
that justifies them. Therefore, it is exactly in that sense that entitlement not only 
means a legal condition but a just one as well. From a theoretical perspective, the 
first implication is that there is no need for moral justification because the moral 
stand, and the moral definition of rights is inherently part of all legal systems; the 
logic of a system of law and the set of assumptions over which it is constructed 
will provide the basic elements of the moral dimension as well.  
But there is also another implication that has to do with the anchoring of 
the concept of fairness or justice to specific systems of law, and that works 
against proposals of moral justification with a universal pretension. What is 
defined as fair in a context, that is in a system of law, is not necessarily fair in 
another context. Or, from a different point of view, each system of law makes 
certain assumptions about fairness and works with its own concept of justice that 
is singular to its logic and its goals, and these can be easily in direct opposition to 
other concepts of justice and assumptions about fairness. Because the moral 
dimension of rights is seen as part and parcel of the system of law, principles of 
fairness are contextual and relative to that system, and cannot transcend their 
historical and social limits or have any universal claims. 
 22 
It is within the boundaries of the argumentative polarity between an 
essentialist and a contextualist position that Jack Donnelly, as well as Leslie John 
Macfarlane, reflect on the concept of human rights and decide to face the problem 
of universality. 
Although both authors coincide in distinguishing two fundamental realms 
of analysis, the moral and the normative or legal, the way they argue the universal 
character of human rights and present the criteria for their universal validity is 
quite different. While Macfarlane circumscribes the criteria for universality to the 
problem and definition of entitlement, Donnelly builds his argument proposing 
that there are minimum and sufficient elements in each one of the analytic terrains 
to be able to speak of two types of universality, a moral and a normative one. 
Macfarlane starts by defining that: "Human rights are those moral rights 
which are owed to each man or woman by every man or woman solely by reason 
of being human" (1985, p.3). 
There is no room for doubt in Macfarlane's definition of human rights; 
these are moral and their realization is possible by a generalized yet individual 
action: the singular act of recognizing that every human being is entitled to human 
rights. The introduction of the "moral" as a qualifier in the own definition of 
human rights eliminates all possible space for multidimensional speculation. For 
Macfarlane the "moral" is not a dimension of human rights; morality is the core of 
the definition and is absolutely vital to any effort to conceptualize them. Yet, at 
the same time, their expression and recognition are made possible by means of 
individual social interactions. The existence of individuals presumes a moral 
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contract, where a sense of essential reciprocity assures that the acknowledgment 
of individual rights is at the same time the recognition of those same rights in 
others. This mechanism of individualistic entitlement and recognition completely 
excludes the social realm as having any significant role in this process. While this 
alternative might have the virtue of pointing out the need for all individuals to 
recognize human rights as a prerequisite to their extensive respect, neglecting to 
identify the importance of social institutions (in particular the state) in the 
processes of entitlement results in a perspective that is politically naive and 
sociologically frail. 
The explicit reference to morality in Macfarlane, becomes implicit in the 
"minimalist" definition proposed by Donnelly. "If human rights are the rights one 
has simply because one is a human being, as they usually are thought to be, then 
they are held ‘universally,’ by all human beings" (1989, p.1). 
It is from the presumption of an implicit but pervasive moral agreement 
where Donnelly will derive the universality of rights, in a kind of tautological 
reasoning: if rights "exist" for all, then they will be possessed universally by all. 
The general recognition of human rights is what grants them "existence", and for 
Donnelly this implies, in one way or another, a moral agreement that is universal. 
It is clear that this way of approaching the moral dimension avoids having to 
present arguments that would anchor or offer any foundations to the claim of 
moral universality. To this route of "moral" argumentation he will add a 
pragmatic dimension: 
Human rights in the contemporary world are universal in another sense: 
they are almost universally accepted-at least in word, or as ideal standards. 
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All states regularly proclaim their acceptance of and adherence to 
international human rights norms, and charges of human rights violations 
are among the strongest charges that can be made in international 
relations. Half the world's states have undertaken international legal 
obligation to implement these rights by becoming parties to the 
International Human Rights Covenants, and almost all other nations have 
either signed but not yet ratified the Covenants (the United States is the 
most prominent in this group) or have otherwise expressed approval of 
and commitment to their content (1989, p.1). 
Donnelly's added dimension, from which he will also derive universality, 
is based on a de facto political situation that has a strong practical intention and 
that deserves some comment. Considering the difficulties of producing 
agreements on the grounding criteria for human rights, the appeal of a pragmatic 
stance is to be able to move beyond the complexities of that debate and to 
advance an agenda for their protection. It makes a call for action in light of and 
beyond profound theoretical disagreements between perspectives. Political action 
benefits from a practical stance because it avoids bringing mobilization to a halt 
while theoretical issues are being "solved". But this can be done through other 
mechanisms without having to force processes of argumentation. Instead, this 
position decides to find a source of universality where there are only political 
agreements between some nations. 
I see at least two dangerous consequences from this pragmatic position. 
Perhaps the most obvious one has to do with its logic. To argue that human rights 
are universal because there is a political agreement in place implies that all 
political agreements are in essence universal because they are based on shared 
values and interpretations. If there were a social realm of interaction in which it is 
unwise to assume this, that would exactly be politics. Political decisions are based 
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on strategic rationality; as a nation it could be in my best interest to sign an 
international agreement on human rights, but this does not imply that I will (as a 
state) do everything in my power to entitle, enforce and protect them within 
national boundaries. In fact, it cannot even be assumed that signing an 
international document on human rights means a common interpretation, between 
the signing parties, about their moral and political value. Universal validity cannot 
be derived from national treaties, because political interactions are ruled by 
strategic purposes and do not require substantive agreements or common held 
believes.  
The other problem has to do with the implications for theoretical debate. 
The pragmatic preoccupation of Donnnelly's proposal has the virtue of favoring 
mobilization and action, but it is problematic because it is actually in detriment of 
theoretical advancement. By sidestepping the issue of universality at the 
theoretical level and suggesting a practical solution, he is actually suggesting that 
the theoretical debate is basically unnecessary to the claim of universal validity. 
Even if at this point it seems extremely difficult to imagine a possible solution to 
the theoretical debate, that in itself cannot constitute an argument for abandoning 
substantive reflection on the issue. His proposal is unable to resist the temptation 
of engaging a pragmatic fallacy: trying to solve a substantive problem with 
practical arguments. 
Although also pragmatic, Macfarlane doesn't find it acceptable to derive 
universality from the possibility of generating international treaties or agreements 
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and interpreting these as processes of widespread acceptance. In contrast, 
Macfarlane turns to the argument of entitlement. 
Claims to universal rights must be seen as claims to which one can 
establish a universal entitlement, rather than claims which have universal 
support. Universal rights necessarily preclude any discrimination or 
exclusion, whether on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status (1985, p.6). 
Even from a pragmatic perspective, both positions have to face sooner or 
later the political and sociological problems that profoundly challenge both 
"international accords" and "general processes of entitlement" as solid sources of 
universality. On the whole, those problems can be understood as anti-universal 
forces that act directly against the efforts of pragmatists to claim that human 
rights are universal, based on practical reasoning. 
The definition of membership, the political composition, and the 
institutional dynamics; the normative differentials, and the power relations among 
those national states that compose the United Nations constitute a group of 
anti-universal forces that are constantly putting at risk and questioning the 
legitimacy of international agreements and the adoption of resolutions. The 
context in which international agreements are designed, structured, proposed and 
passed is basically determined by power differentials between nations that have 
been made institutional procedures. How can we argue that international 
agreements can be sources of universality when they are not even based on simple 
forms of democratic procedure?4 
                                                 
     4 I will come back to this problem later in this chapter. 
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While the universal character of entitlement seems to be secured in the 
abstract definition of being human, this swiftly disappears when we confront the 
social condition of human beings. The enormous social and political distance that 
exists between the entitlement to human rights and the real possibilities of their 
enjoyment, permanently questions the relevance of the abstract definition of 
entitlement for the lives of individual human beings living in specific social 
contexts. Formal entitlement and real exercise is mediated by social inequality. 
While abstract ent itlement applies equally to all human beings, the possibilities of 
enjoyment and exercise are determined and distributed unequally to all members 
of specific societies. Abstract entitlement can preclude all forms of unequal 
consideration and treatment, but the possibilities of exercise and enjoyment are 
trapped within the confines of the structure and system of opportunities, which 
individuals are obligated to face everyday of their lives. In this crude way, social 
inequality constitutes another group of anti-universal forces. 
Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) introduces 
an admonition: all the rights described in this Declaration are to be recognized 
"without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" 
(United Nations, 1979, p.148). The admonition is trying to establish standards of 
equality as a fundamental consideration for entitlement, because without equality 
in the processes of entitlement rights for all human beings would be transformed 
into privileges for some human beings. However, at the same time, it is making an 
explicit recognition of the fundamental reality that those differentiations, 
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translated into social inequalities, would not only make crucial distinctions in the 
entitlement of rights, but would in fact undermine the process in its entirety.  
To be able to guarantee universality, the definition of human rights has to 
make sure it precludes any form of social differentiation (that has a potential for 
creating forms of inequality) as criteria or conditions for granting entitlement. At 
the same time, however, it means that different social conditions of existence and 
amounts of resources are inevitably present and create disturbances, so to speak, 
in the processes of entitlement to the extent that they are a constitutive part of the 
context within which individuals live and develop. Universality, understood as 
equal entitlement, can only be secured in the domain of an abstract definition of 
human rights; nowhere else is it possible to preclude social inequality. Individuals 
and groups of individuals are "born into" certain forms of entitlement and 
possibilities of exercise because the realms in which these rights materialize are 
unequal. 
The political and sociological conditions, that I have identified here as 
anti-universal forces, are not only a reminder that the pragmatic route for arguing 
the universality of human rights is problematic, but I believe they profoundly 
question this alternative as viable for the task at hand. From a political and 
sociological perspective, the practical sources of universality for human rights are 
undermined, in the practical realm, by the anti-universal forces of history and 
social context. 
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1.3.2 The Problem of Foundations  
Linking universality to the definition of entitlement (Macfarlane) or to the 
widespread acceptance of international declarations (Donnelly) can also be 
interpreted as a conceptual recourse to escape the problems that are associated 
with essentialist or foundationalist positions. By making pragmatic arguments 
about the universal character of human rights, both Macfarlane and Donnelly 
avoid having to present philosophical or theoretical argumentation about the need 
for human rights and to confront competing perspectives in this terrain. But to 
avoid confrontation with different moral interpretations and discursive 
elaborations can imply and mean, simultaneously, avoiding all processes of moral 
justification. Under the pretense of escaping essentialist reasoning via normative 
pragmatism, these positions end up renouncing to the possibility of reflecting on 
the philosophical foundations of human rights. These pragmatic perspectives 
seem to be equating moral justification with essentialism or foundationalism, and 
therefore do not see any possible reflection or debate that can escape the traps of 
the thought process, reasoning, and conclusions of those positions. 
Other authors argue the universality of human rights from an entirely 
different position (Lukes, 1993; Rorty, 1993; Sjoberg, 1996; Turner 1993). First, 
they refuse to renounce to philosophical argumentation and theoretical 
deliberation for fear of falling into essentialism or foundationalism. Second, they 
face the problem of the philosophical foundations by debating competing 
perspectives, and putting forward their own proposals. Third, they decide to run 
conceptual risks when structuring their thought processes and explaining their 
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criteria for grounding human rights. From this group of authors, and for the 
purpose of reviewing the problems with the elaboration of foundations, I would 
like to turn my attention to, what I believe is the most comprehensive 
argumentation recently set forth.  
Bryan S. Turner proposes the inherent frailty of the human species as a 
route for justifying the universality of human rights. Through a reinterpretation of 
Gehlen's anthropological philosophy, Turner seeks to substitute natural law as a 
foundation of the theory and philosophy of human rights for two interlinked 
concepts: the ontological frailty of human beings and the precariousness of social 
arrangements and institutions. The author will try to convince us that the 
relationship between these two concepts is not only dynamic and dialectical, but 
also essentially paradoxical. 
Human beings are frail-he argues-, because their lives are finite, because 
they typically exist under conditions of scarcity, disease and danger, and 
because they are constrained by physical processes of age ing and decay 
(Turner, 1993, p.509). 
Now then, it is exactly because of this condition of ontological frailty the reason 
for which social institutions have been created. Social institutions are designed to 
protect individuals from the threats of their environment and from their own 
existential frailty. However, Turner notices an inherent paradox. 
The institutions which are designed to protect the human beings-- the 
state, the law, and the church in particular-- are often precisely those 
institutions which threaten human life by the fact that they enjoy a 
monopoly of power (Turner, 1993, p.510). 
The concept of human fragility has, however, interpretations opposed to 
the one offered by Turner, and that are problematic for justification and debate, in 
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general. These interpretations are related, in my opinion, to the modern origin of 
the concept of natural rights, as well as to the influence of utilitarianism and 
positivism throughout the 20th century. In the search for the essential 
characteristics of human nature the argumentation and debate has been moved to 
the domain of biology and the natural sciences, under the illusion of being able to 
discover stable and immutable qualities of our human existence. Not only are 
these analytical movements completely foreign to the forms of moral justification 
in the tradition of Greek philosophy and Roman jurisprudence. These positions 
are also troubling because they remain unaware, or would rather deny the 
importance, of contemporary research that recognizes the crucial differences 
between realms of argumentation and types of validity claims: the 
practical-scientific, the moral-normative, and the subjective-aesthetic, and that 
know of the risks and the consequences of subordinating an argumentative 
process of one realm to the logic to another (Dews, 1999; Habermas, 1984; Hoy 
and McCarthy, 1994). To argue a problem of the moral order with a scientific 
validity claim is to make unrecoverable violence to the own possibility of 
argumentation; we cannot explain something that belongs to one realm with 
validity claims from another. 
That is what I find to be the fundamental problem of the argument that is 
justified by using reasons from our biological condition of existence and the 
peculiarities of our patterns of growth. From this perspective, human beings are 
essentially fragile because they lack the anatomical and physiological equipment 
that would allow an early autonomy from their progenitors. This fragility 
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determines the fundamental and lingering dependence of human beings. Although 
this route of argumentation might have some undeniable virtues, the perspective 
suffers the risk of producing myopic interpretations and becoming easy prey of 
essentialism anchored in biological reductionism. 
Explaining the fragility of human beings by comparing their biological 
equipment and condition to other animals, makes unnecessary abstraction of the 
condition that ultimately defines and separates humans from other animals: the 
fact that humans are social beings. Though Turner is sufficiently careful to 
include in the same definition of fragility the idea of social conditions of 
existence, by means of the triple concept of resources, distribution and scarcity, 
he pays excessive homage to that he seeks to substitute as the foundation of 
human rights: natural law. 
While introducing the dimension of the social in the explanation of human 
frailty, the theoretical force of the concept of social precariousness ultimately 
depends on the strength of the argument that would claim that human frailty is 
ontological. In that way, the social domain appears only as an added dimension, 
but is not made the core of the argumentation or presented as an argumentative 
perspective. Additionally, the problem of giving human frailty the same weight as 
an ontological argument is that it fosters an interpretation of social precariousness 
as a trans-historic phenomenon that leads to pessimistic and politically fatalistic 
conclusions, erasing the constructive possibility of social and political agency: 'if 
it is connatural to the existence of human beings, then there is nothing we can do 
about it'. 
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In spite of the objections that we can find and the critiques that we can 
formulate, the importance that the concept of human frailty has for the theory of 
the human rights resides, I believe, in the implications for the processes of 
argumentation and justification and the inclusion of concepts and elaborations 
about justice and solidarity, morality and ethics (see Honneth, 1995). Or to put it 
in other terms, the central importance is that it brings back moral justification and 
acknowledges its legitimacy in the search for the philosophical foundations of 
human rights. 
I believe that the theoretical reflection and the moral argumentation on the 
philosophical foundations of human rights would continue benefiting from an 
exploration of the possibilities and limitations of the concept of frailty. An 
alternative, is to outline an interpretation where the ontological character of the 
concept was definitively liberated from a biological anchorage and moved with 
determination to the center of the structural tensions between the particular and 
the general, between the singular and the plural, between uniqueness and 
commonality, between self and other, between personal identity and social 
identity. From this perspective, human being's frailty could be explained by 
means of the complex interconnectedness between individual and society. Both, 
the processes of individuation and the constitution of individuals as autonomous 
beings are intimately tied to the social condition of social groups. It is through the 
socialization process that individuation is carried out. The socialization processes 
and those of individuation are fundamentally interconnected, are tightly 
interwoven (Habermas, 1990, Chapter V, and 1992, Chapter 7). That is why, 
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while intersubjective relationships produce the necessary conditions for the 
reproduction of social networks, the reproduction of social networks produce the 
elementary conditions for the formation of identity, and personality. 
If we transfer the analytical axis and justification to the complex 
relationship between the individual and the social, we can avoid moving the moral 
argument away from the social dimension that properly defines human beings. At 
the same time, we return to individuals, groups, and social movements their 
political agency, that is, their capacity to intervene, to modify, to subvert, and to 
transform the systems and institutions that instead of assisting, and protecting the 
fragility of human existence, they are constantly threatening the life itself of 
human beings as members of societies. 
1.4 THEORETICAL REFLECTION AND THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
Once outlined the argumentative horizons and the problems that 
universality of moral judgments has for the philosophical foundations of human 
rights, I find it appropriate to raise the question of the political and practical 
implications of theoretical reflections on these issues. 
Ultimately, the perspectives that defend the universal potentiality of the 
discourse of human rights are founded in the conviction that reason is universal 
and that the local, community, regional, national, ethnic, religious and linguistic 
uses do not divide reason in multiple forms of rationality. 
What counts in any instance as a good reason obviously depends on 
criteria that have changed in the course of history (including the history of 
science). The context-dependence of the criteria by which the members of 
different cultures at different times judge differently the validity of 
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expressions does not, however, mean that the ideas of truth, of normative 
rightness, of sincerity, and of authenticity that underlie (only intuitively, to 
be sure) the choice of criteria are context-dependent in the same degree 
(Habermas, 1984, p.55). 
The fact that different forms of interpretation exist of the relationship 
individuals establish in the realms of the objective world, the social world and the 
subjective world, does not cancel the basic truth that all the different types of 
interpretations are based and developed on the universal possibility of carrying 
out an interpretation. 
In the international debate on human rights, universalistic perspectives 
have been opposed by cultural relativist positions. 
The critique that cultural relativism has leveled against the universality of 
human rights has been constructed around two axes. First, they have evaluated the 
extent to which human rights have been protected and respected around the world 
and the degree to which international organizations have been able to prosecute 
and punish their violations, and use these criteria to argue not only the limitations 
in acceptance, scope, and legal enforcement, but basically the non-universalistic 
nature of human rights. This analytic movement and the arguments that follow, 
lack conceptual support because they face a supra- legal problem with approaches 
that are proper to an analysis of legal application; because they use arguments of a 
pragmatic order to evaluate a problem of a moral order, doing profound violence 
to the possibility of debating about the universal potentials of human rights and 
the required processes of justification. 
Second, cultural relativists believe that the core conceptualization of 
human rights is ethnocentric. The central argument is based on the idea that the 
 36 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was constructed on an, implicit or 
explicit, ethnocentric definition of human beings, social relations, and moral 
standards. That the definition of human rights, as we know them today, is 
structured on moral precepts of dignity, respect, and freedom that are widely 
shared by western cultures but do not have the same importance or interpretations 
for non-western cultures and other social contexts. 
I believe that the critique of ethnocentric positions has important virtues 
that should be defended, since it contributes to the formation of multidimensional 
perspectives that are inclusive and de-centered. But to transform a critique of an 
apparent ethnocentric position into cultural relativism is, in my opinion, 
theoretically questionable and politically suspicious. On the one hand, it is 
mounted on very doubtful assumptions and, on the other, it has dangerous 
political consequences. 
Questionable assumptions:  
a) The diverse world cultures are relatively isolated from each other. Each one is 
impermeable to the existence and influence of other cultures, and to their 
different frames of interpretation. 
b) The interpretive distance between different cultures is such that it is impossible 
to establish exchanges, discussions, and debates about cultural paradigms 
and to build discursive-political platforms for inclusive agreements across 
cultures. 
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c) The fact that cultures are so different and that they hold such dissimilar frames 
of interpretation reflects the existence of different ways of conceiving, 
different forms of rationality. 
Political consequences: 
a) Protected by international law that grants rights of sovereignty to nations, and 
on behalf of national concerns and ideologies, governments all over the 
world have committed abuses and have systematically violated human 
rights. 
b) Cultural relativism has served as an excuse to the exercise of discretional and 
violent forms of power, and to authoritarian forms of national government. 
c) Arguing respect to different cultural traditions, respect to different forms of 
interpreting life and social relations, cultural relativism ends up also 
defending practices (at a local, community, regional and national level) 
that are clearly in contradiction with the general spirit and the logic of the 
international agreements on human rights. 
In essence, cultural relativism has been used politically to advance the 
purposes of certain powerful social groups, in specific national contexts. It is used 
as a discursive recourse to fend off critique, dismiss scrutiny, and avoid 
evaluation. It has allowed certain national social groups to hide behind the 
arguments of cultural relativism and elude having to explain the reasons why they 
act the way they do, to justify the ir actions, and expose their positions to the 
consideration, debate, and critique of international cultural, social, and political 
communities. This problem becomes absolutely dramatic when the groups that 
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hide under the mantel of "cultural difference", protecting themselves from 
international critique, are oppressive groups that exercise specific powers in the 
context of their communities and societies, to the disadvantage of other groups 
and at the expense of their integrity and humanity. 
The problem is far from having an easy solution. Accusations of 
ethnocentrism and of imposing ways of thinking, interpreting and judging have 
created true havoc to international organisms and have, at certain points, 
paralyzed the activities of movements whose goals are to protect and defend 
human rights all over the globe. 
I do not believe that philosophical reflection, theoretical debate, or the 
construction of social theory require of practical arguments to justify their 
validity. It is only in the world of theory and of theoretical discussion where it is 
possible to thematize and problematize certain aspects of our existence and of 
social life. Those aspects, for example, that are not vital for the daily life and 
practical needs individuals. This particular quality and its crucial contribution to 
the formation of critical and plural thought, make theory a practice (Calhoun, 
1995; Habermas, 1973; Kellner, 1989; McCarthy, 1978). However, to this very 
day, the conceptual problems associated with cultural relativism and its practical 
and political consequences constitute a very clear indication of why theoretical 
reflection (about the possibilities of universal validity and foundations) is so 
important. The legitimacy of the international movements that are mobilized to 
implement the general standards and protect human rights around the world 
demand it. 
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1.5 ON THE ADVANTAGES OF A PROCEDURALIST APPROACH 
Regarding the analysis of human rights and of the problem of universality, 
I believe it is an imperative to carry out multidimensional approaches, moving 
simultaneously in the different analytic spheres of ethics and their corresponding 
reflections about justice. In this way, we would intervene in substantive debates 
about the philosophical foundations of human rights, concerned (at the same time) 
with the political consequences of what is being debated, and making sure that our 
forms of argumentation are made with the possibility of reaching an agreement in 
mind, and based on an intersubjective rationality. 
However, is it possible to intervene in substantive debates about the 
philosophical foundations of human rights without falling into the problems of 
essentialism or of essentialist positions?  
I believe that the development of substantive arguments on the 
philosophical foundations of human rights is not only necessary, but also 
absolutely vital for the advancement of knowledge in this area. Nevertheless, I 
also believe it is important to recognize the conceptual risks involved. To 
intervene in the substantive debates on the foundations of human rights with 
philosophical elaborations, theoretical proposals, and moral arguments always 
generates the risk of producing essentialist claims. In the search for foundations, 
there is a strong temptation of "finding" what essentially explains human nature, 
thus requiring and justifying the presence of a normative regulation of behavior 
like "human rights". Considering these characteristics as deep-seated and trans-
historical turns a temptation into an essentialist argument. 
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However, not all interventions in substantive debates become, for that 
mere fact, essentialist in nature. For the risk to become an essentialist position it 
requires, in my opinion, of a conceptual movement of exclusion, that has 
profound political implications. 
An exploration that claims to have found the essence of human nature 
implies, from a construction of discourse perspective, a simultaneous assertion of 
exceptionality and an exclusion of other claims. A claim about the essential 
qualities of human beings is a claim that seeks to "monopolize knowledge," so to 
speak of the human condition, for if it has found the essence all inquiry must 
cease! 
Furthermore, if the legitimacy of the claim and the widespread acceptance 
of the argument requires of a hegemonic imposition rather than of a process of 
interactive justification, then, the claim will be built on the possibility of 
canceling other points of view, other forms of argumentation. From this position, 
debate is not a dialogical process of intersubjective rationality, but a war of 
opposed perspectives out of which only one should emerge as victorious and, at 
least, one as defeated. 
Essentialist positions not only do not benefit from exchange and debate, 
but also actually preclude the existence of other claims that are as legitimate as 
the claims they are intending to forge. To the extent that competing perspectives 
represent the annihilation of essentialist claims, essentialism cannot grant 
legitimacy to other interpretations, and other theoretical positions; their existence 
signifies its negation. Therefore, the conceptual exclusion of other interpretations 
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predates the possibility of exchanging and debating. The conceptual exclusion can 
be found in the definition of problems, the elaboration of arguments, and the 
design of the whole process of moral justification. 
To be able to escape essentialism, all interventions in substantive debates 
and their proposals should be formulated knowing that the validity of their 
postulates and the legitimacy of their approaches can only be recognized and 
ratified by means of processes of exchange, discussion, and debate in appropriate 
social spaces and under equal conditions and democratic relations. Only then, can 
we recognize a move from a rationality of exclusion to a rationality of inclusion, 
which allows for intersubjective understanding. 
It seems to me that the debate on the philosophical foundations of human 
rights will not find horizons of constructive resolutions until it is confronted, 
simultaneously, in its different dimensions: recognizing the importance of 
concrete political actions, debating substantively, and making sure that all 
agreements, normative formulations, and debates occur in the context of 
democratic procedures of intersubjective argumentation and justification. 
This is where, I believe, communicative or discourse ethics has a lot to 
offer (Apel, 1990; Benhabib, 1992; Benhabib and Dallmayr, 1990; Habermas, 
1990 & 1993). The strong dialogical approach, the concern about the conditions 
under which argumentation takes place, and its demand for intersubjective 
rationality provides sound insights and solid guidance on how to face the 
challenges of both the problems of universality and foundations of human rights. 
Communicative ethics –Benhabib explains– is a deontological theory to 
the extent that it constraints conceptions of the moral in accordance with 
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certain restrictions upon procedures of moral justification. It is not 
“neutral,” either in the sense of having weak philosophical presuppositions 
or in the sense of being indifferent vis-à-vis competing ways of life. Yet it 
is reflexive, it allows the non-dogmatic questioning of its own 
presuppositions; it is pluralist and tolerant, in that it promotes the 
coexistence of all ways of life compatible with the acceptance of a 
framework of universal rights and justice. In this sense in communicative 
ethics as well, the right is prior to the good but the right itself promotes a 
vision of the good life which cherishes the norms of universal respect and 
egalitarian reciprocity (1992, p.45-6). 
These contemporary proceduralist perspectives have frequently been 
charged of being formalist. The implication is that they are only worried by the 
formal aspects of communicative situations and the formation of transitive 
consensus. However, the meta-ethical proposals when interpreted properly –as 
Benhabib argues– have crucial substantive implications and consequences for all 
dimensions of life. “Communicative ethics promotes universalist and 
postconventionalist perspective on all ethical relations: it has implications for 
familial life no less than for the democratic legislature” (1992, p.39). 
However, the relation between substance and procedure has another 
dimension of meaning that sets this perspective apart from other approaches to 
moral reasoning and justification. 
As procedural theory of moral argumentation, communicative ethics is 
based on certain substantive presuppositions. In my view this is 
unavoidable. All procedural theories must presuppose some substantive 
commitments. The issue is whether these substantive commitments are 
presented as theoretical certainties whose status cannot be further 
questioned, or whether we can conceive of ethical discourse in such a 
radically reflexive fashion that even the presuppositions of discourse can 
themselves be challenged, called into question and debated (Benhabib, 
1992, p.74). 
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In fact, I would argue that this reflexive quality, that is embedded in the 
proceduralist perspective of discourse ethics, works as a sound mechanism that 
implodes essentialist reasoning and minimizes the risk of falling into essentialist 
thought processes. 
Ultimately, who can validate the result of a substantive discussion or 
debate about the universality or the philosophical foundations of human rights, 
without the procedural conditions that can assure that all of those that intervene 
do so in equality of circumstances and that what defines the last content of a 
resolution or agreement (even when partial and transitive) is the product of a 
communicative process of intersubjective argumentation among equals? 
1.6 WORLD SYSTEM, UNITED NATIONS, AND THE UNFULFILLED UNIVERSAL 
CAPACITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Once presented the central pieces of my position in regard to the debate on 
the philosophical foundations of human rights, I would like to conclude this 
chapter by risking a reflection, that I believe might contribute to the advancement 
of our understanding of the potential universality of human rights as a practice 
and a discourse. 
By extending the insights of discourse ethics into the institutional domain 
of human rights, I argue for a sociological critique of the operation of the United 
Nations, of the system of differential powers among nation members, and of its 
capability for the formation of international agreements and accords. This 
procedural dimension becomes crucial for two reasons. On the one hand, it allows 
for an evaluation of the United Nation's possibility of being a participating agent 
and institution in the development of a just and democratic international system. 
 44 
On the other, it enables us to recognize the institutional possibility of creating 
overlapping consensus and their degree of international legitimacy. If we are 
willing to understand the contemporary definition of human rights as a 
historically grounded and transitory consensus, this procedural dimension reveals 
itself as a crucial yet unrealized capacity for universality. 
If some international process can be linked to the development of human 
rights in the 20th century it is that of globalization. Although the concept was 
introduced to suggest deep changes in the forms of production, the transformation 
of international economic relations and, later on, the progressive expansion of 
financial capital at an international level, as well as crucial alterations in the 
relationships of exchange between national markets, today the term globalization 
suggests uses beyond the characterization of phenomena linked to relations of 
production and exchange. Indeed, the theoretical proposals and studies developed 
by Wallerstein (1979, 1984, 1991) have intervened systematically not only in the 
investigation of the effects of economic globalization in other dimensions of 
international life, but of the parallel developments and interconnected changes in 
politics and culture at a global level. 
In that line of thought and following a theoretical development proposed 
by Robertson, Bryan Turner intends to understand the institutionalization of 
human rights, phenomenon that began with the formulation of the Letter of 
Intentions of the United Nations, as a central aspect of the social process of 
globalization. Furthermore, based on a work of Weissbrodt, he takes the argument 
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even further by arguing that human rights could represent the first universal 
ideology in the world (1993, p.450). 
Although it is clear that Turner's intentions are to offer the first conceptual 
building blocks of a contemporary sociology of rights, it is unfortunate that he did 
not explore the conceptual linkages between the social process of globalization 
and the possible existence of a universal ideology (human rights), beyond those 
two statements. It seems to me that such an exploration could open new analytical 
horizons and lead to very fruitful proposals. 
The concept of rights presupposes the concept of state of rights. In this 
same sense, citizenship rights presuppose a state of civil rights. In the same way 
that the development of a state of rights represents a previous and parallel 
development to the emergence of the modern state, the development of an 
"international state of rights" represents a previous and parallel development to 
the possibility of the emergence of a modern state that is not national but 
international. 
Human rights, insofar as they are extra-political or supra-societal rights 
which have their legitimacy beyond the state, are crucial in protecting 
individuals against state violence, or at least in providing the normative 
grounds on which individuals could be protected against state violence 
(Turner, 1993, p.510). 
In this way, the International Declaration of Human Rights, its corresponding 
discourse, and the design of the concurrent normative regulations would 
constitute the international state of rights. The international modern state, in turn, 
would be comprised by the United Nations, and its corresponding institutions and 
organisms. 
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A critical examination, from a sociology of nation-states and 
bureaucracies perspective, of the institutional existence and political functioning 
of the United Nations would reveal that, like in all nation-states and their 
institutions of governing, there are discretional, situational, and systematic forms 
of exclusion and marginalization of certain political positions, their discourses, 
and voices, regardless if these are recognized as members, groups or associations. 
In other words, we would find systems that are institutionalized (or not) of 
exercising power and of distributing privileges and disadvantages among 
countries, as well as specific forms of constructing national group hegemonies. 
Phenomena like the unequal distribution of the right to vote and to exercise a veto 
between members; the internal system of hierarchies among groups, organisms, 
and committees and their consequent effect on the formulation of agreements and 
declarations; the forms of obtaining economic resources, and the political use of 
funds and contributions, are all manifestations that clearly speak about an 
institutional system that is far from being democratic. Paradoxically, this same 
system of institutions has the normative ability and exe rcises its international right 
to qualify, to sanction, and to evaluate if nations around the world have 
governments and political systems that are democratic, and the degree to which 
their forms of governing are democratic. 
The cognitive pretense of this route of reflection would be to anchor the 
study of the Organization of the United Nations and of its operations in the 
structural and systemic analysis of the institutions of power, the internal 
normative standards and procedures, and the correlation of forces that is in 
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constant flux. The objective would be double, on the one hand to liberate the 
inquiry from instrumentalist’s interpretations: "The United Nations is only one 
more instrument of domination and control that powerful countries exercise over 
the rest of the world." On the other, to liberate it from utopian-catastrophic 
interpretations: "The United Nations is an impossible utopia; the original idea is 
without a doubt valuable but the unequal political and economic power in the 
world make that a project that is virtually unrealizable." It would be, in sum, a 
way of seriously exploring the democratic possibilities of the United Nations as a 
supra-national organization and institution, and a space for the construction of 
international consensus and new political relations. 
Another dimension, that is less obviously linked to its internal operation 
but that has a great impact on the global community at large, has to do with the 
ability of the United Nations to create legitimate international normative 
standards, to foster global justice, and to generate a concurrent moral discourse. 
One can argue that the definition of human rights after the Second World 
War, is essentially different from other previous definitions (from the English, 
American, and French Revolutions), because its specification, delimitation, and 
establishment was product of a multinational agreement; a product of a process by 
which we can, today, evaluate the definition from a contextual and procedural 
perspective.5 That is, we can analyze the contemporary definition of human rights 
as contextually relative and historically dependent on the conditions under which 
the agreement was accomplished. The argument, then, is not based on trying to 
                                                 
     5 Although profoundly imperfect, because it was founded on the basis of an unequal distribution 
of political and institutional power, and not on the basis of a democratic exercise of the political 
will of all nations. 
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reveal the theoretical differences between the definitions, but on the social and 
political implications, and especially on the meta-ethical implications that the 
contemporary conceptualization of human rights is a product of a "relatively 
collective" process of negotiation and agreement. From this perspective, instead 
of understanding human rights as lacking a reasonable foundation or in the need 
for a set of essential, unchangeable, and transhistorical characteristics (as an 
essentialist argument would want to claim), human rights are presented as a 
historically specific agreement, fundamentally modifiable, and imperfectly 
collective. 
The contemporary definition of human rights has, in the previous sense, an 
unfulfilled universal capacity. It is a capacity that is given by the procedural 
dimension; this is, by the fact and implication that the definition becomes a direct 
consequence of a collective undertaking, of a general agreement, of an 
overlapping consensus (Taylor, 1996 and 1999). 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a multinational agreement 
that was made under historically specific conditions, and its level of international 
legitimacy is in direct relation to the procedures that led to the formation of that 
agreement and the processes that allowed to reach a particular consensus. 
The Universal Declaration was formulated and approved in a context of 
power differentials and hierarchies between nation members, unequal forms of 
participation and decision making, and institutionalized methods of exclusion. To 
the extent that the agreement was not reached through collective deliberation, 
democratic procedures, and comprehensive forms of inclusion the Universal 
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Declaration emerged as a partial, slanted, and exclusive agreement. It reflects the 
pressing needs, interpretations, and notions of those na tion members (unequally) 
involved in the process. At its best, it is a declaration with international and 
universal pretensions. 
The ratification processes (in the 60s and 70s) that have followed the 
Universal Declaration of 1948 have undoubtedly increased the number of nations 
that support the initial definition of human rights as espoused by the United 
Nations (Palumbo, 1982). Additionally, the expansion of the core concepts in 
1976 to economic, social, and cultural rights first, and to civil and political rights 
later has served the purposes of increasing their legitimacy as an international 
normative discourse.  
I agree with Drucilla Cornell "that in our complex world we can only hope 
for an overlapping consensus on universals if we allow norms of behavior, even 
as we call them human rights, to be loosened from their connection to Western 
notions of the individual" (1998, p.169). An overlapping consensus, however, 
might involve an important challenge or at least a serious critique of the 
contemporary definition of human rights, and simultaneously of the institution 
within which it can be potentially fruitful to develop the challenge or critique, if 
we were to expect any significant and global impact. In our contemporary world, 
the United Nations as a meta-national institution seems to be the most adequate 
social space for posing and resolving these challenges, and for negotiating new 
meanings of a discourse that can claim universality both procedurally and 
substantively. However, the structure, system, and organization of the institution 
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along lines of unequal power and privilege disable this possibility, or at best 
constitute a major roadblock. 
Substantively speaking, the current definition of human rights is based on 
concepts of the individual that seem to be in contradiction with non-Western 
traditions of thought. Charles Taylor reminds us of how for many peoples around 
the world Western individualism is ethically undesirable, and how this has created 
reluctance to accept a model of human rights based on this premise. 
[The subjective concept of right] seems to give pride of place to 
autonomous individuals, determined to demand their rights, even (indeed 
especially) in the space of widespread social consensus. How does this fit 
with the Confucian emphasis on close personal relationships, not only as 
highly valued in themselves but as model for the wider society? Can 
people who imbibe the full Western human rights ethos, which (in one 
version anyway) reaches its highest expression in the lone courageous 
individual fighting against the evils of social conformity for his rights, 
ever be good members of a "Confucian" society? And how does this ethic 
of demanding what is due to us fit with the Theravada Buddhist search for 
selflessness, for self-giving, and dana (generosity)? 
I believe that in a post-Enlightenment era, a discourse that claims to be 
universal requires at least of one central condition: to remain open; open to 
critique and challenge, even when this might entail a move towards constant re-
argumentation, re-conceptualization, and re-definition. That is, a discourse that 
claims to be universal requires to embrace a definition of itself that allows it to 
move in space and in time beyond the conditions that gave it birth; stagnation is 
the death of all possible claims to universality. This is the central idea and 
conceptual richness of interpreting the contemporary definition of human rights as 
a transitory agreement, as a transitional consensus. 
 51 
But how can critiques be made if the basic conceptualization is not even 
conceived as criticizable? How can challenges be posed and taken seriously when 
the core definitions are formulated as unequivocal statements or undisputable 
claims? How can alternative interpretations be presented when premises and 
assumptions are far removed from the possibility of modification and change? 
How can diverse and different voices be heard when there is no room for 
plurivocality? How can redefinitions be proposed when the environment of 
communication is not identified and interpreted as a space for collective 
deliberation? 
Notions and interpretations from non-Western cosmologies and traditions 
of thought, have not been well received and taken seriously because they 
challenge not only certain assumptions about the contemporary definition of 
human rights, but also ideas that are central to the cultural and political identity of 
the societies of Western powerful nations (Turner, 1988). 
As long as the institutional context within which the crucial 
determinations about the definition of human rights continue to be removed from 
collective deliberation and democratic procedures of decision-making, the 
pretension of being international and universal will largely remain unfulfilled. 
Unequal participation in the decision making process, allows for certain 
nation members to become gatekeepers and regulators of what is to be discussed. 
Power differentials and a hierarchical organization of the United Nations allow 
certain nation members to have control over the agenda. Thus, challenges to the 
definition of human rights can be "filtered out" or dismissed as "political 
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maneuvering". It is the power they hold over the United Nations that grants them 
a power over the discourse of human rights, as well. 
An international community will grant legitimacy to a definition, in fact to 
a re-definition of human rights if in the process of generating these definitions 
members of this community are constantly recognized and taken into account as 
full and equal members; allowed to voice their specific concerns and particular 
needs; engage in the discussions and debates about the content of the definitions; 
actively participate in the initial design, elaboration, and final product; and 
identify and feel represented by the final product of the agreement.  
The higher the level of legitimacy an agreement has, the more likely it is 
to become a normative discourse. Respect for norms and uncoerced compliance to 
normative standards increases in proportion to the degree of legitimacy they have. 
This is true for individuals as it is for nations. However, this legitimacy depends 
not only on the content of what is agreed and established as a norm but, 
simultaneously, on the form in which the agreement was reached and the norm 
was established. 
The argument is based on a deliberative model of democracy. Seyla 
Benhabib explains it in the following way:  
[I]t is a necessary condition for attaining legitimacy and rationality with 
regard to collective decision making processes in a polity, that the 
institutions of this polity are so arranged that what is considered in the 
common interest of all results from processes of collective deliberation 
conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals. The 
more collective decision-making processes approximate this model the 
more increases the presumption of their legitimacy and rationality (1996, 
p.69). 
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As a product of collective deliberations and agreements between free and 
equal members of an international community, human rights would emerge as a 
transitory consensus submitable to different and new processes of rational 
negotiation that would, in fact, transform their definition from one stage of 
deliberation to another. This is how human rights would acquire full legitimacy, 
and realize its claim to universality.  
Democratic procedure and substantive agreements are intrinsically 
interlinked and fundamentally interdependent (Cohen, 1996). For the time being 
we will have to work with the undemocratic and non-deliberative nature of human 
rights, and their unfulfilled universal capacity. 
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Chapter 2:  Reproductive Rights: An Analytical Proposal 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: STRUCTURE OF THE PROPOSAL 
The central objective of this chapter is to develop a theoretical reading of 
the international and contemporary discourse of reproductive rights. My hope is 
that the perspective and analytical proposal set forth represent a contribution to 
the expansion and consolidation of the field of study, and renders useful for the 
analysis and evaluation of the situation of reproductive rights within national 
contexts. 
The chapter is divided in three sections. In the first section, I explore the 
basic structures of what defines the concept of reproductive rights. From the 
perspective of the foundation of a field of study, and using a genealogical 
approach I attempt to reconstruct the central meanings and basic questions of 
reproduction as rights. This effort has the purpose of establishing some very 
elementary cognitive boundaries for the field, and identifying some issues that 
have political and sociological relevance for the analysis of the international 
discourse of reproductive rights.  
In the second section I identify three contentious and problematic areas: 
entitlement, responsibility, and inequality. From this vantage point I engage the 
international definition of reproductive rights and assess its virtues and 
limitations. Both the definition of entitlement and the concept of responsibility 
have been the most contentious issues of the evolution of reproductive rights. 
While the definition of who constitutes the subject of these rights has been altered 
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and changed numerous times, the concept of responsibility has generated a 
constant debate that, up to this day, remains unresolved. Countries that have 
chosen not to endorse international covenants on reproductive rights have 
precluded their citizens, through a normative marginalization, from their 
protection and enjoyment. Within endorsing nations, however, social inequality is 
the single most important factor in determining the exercise of reproductive 
rights. I end the section by arguing that how and even who gets to enjoy and 
exercise these rights is contingent on the systems of social inequality and the 
structure of opportunities in these societies. 
Finally, in the third section, I develop a normative reading and a 
sociological interpretation of the process of making reproductive decisions. I start 
by exploring the assumptions embedded in the international definition and its 
concurrent discourse. There are a series of assumptions that can be derived and 
made explicit from the definition and its historical development. However, there 
are others that are not easily derived and thus have remained basically implicit 
and unthematized. Yet these are not secondary. I contend that these sets of 
assumptions are fundamental for the exercise of reproductive rights, both in the 
private and public realms, and decisive for reproductive decision-making 
processes. But, what would be the ideal situation and process for making a 
reproductive decision? Taking Habermas' lead, I use the  analytical intention of his 
"ideal speech situation" to produce an "ideal reproductive decision-making 
process." Informed by the standards of justice and equality suggested by 
contemporary human rights and feminist theory, I thematize the required 
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elements, the key social relations, and the necessary conditions for an "ideal 
process." Once established the ideal normative, I turn my attention to the 
sociological dimension. Social structures and social relations represent a 
permanent jeopardy for the actualization of the ideal normative. I conclude the 
section (and the chapter) by assessing the disturbances that the ideal reproductive 
decision-making process suffers when placed in contemporary societies; that is, 
within social contexts that are structured unequally, and where the prevailing form 
of social relations is domination. For both the private and the public realms, I 
identify two main sources of disturbances: power relations and systems of social 
inequality. I examine the distortions these create to the ideal process, the 
constraints they impose over individuals and couples, as well as the effects they 
have on the process of formulating and carrying out reproductive decisions. 
2.2 REPRODUCTION AS RIGHTS 
This first section can be thought of as an effort to lay the basic building 
blocks of the analytical proposal. I begin by engaging in an abstract examination 
of the fundamental components of the discourse of reproductive rights, and will 
suggest some routes of interpretation of its sociological and political meaning. 
2.2.1 Charting a Relation  
An utterance with two related conceptual components, like "reproductive 
rights" (in which one can read the pretense or foundation effort of being placed at 
the center of a cognitive field), contains conceptual proposals that go beyond a 
mere intellectual exploration. At first, this means that the projected images, the 
implied connections, and the conceptual interactions suggested in the one 
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utterance are neither general nor uncertain. It is not that the connection between 
two conceptually autonomous universes is being hypothesized (as an utterance in 
the style of "rights and reproduction" would reflect), but rather that the utterance 
already implies a selective process of reasoning where false hypotheses and 
spurious relations have been discarded. That is to say, in the non-theorized 
utterance of "reproductive rights" previous conceptual work of differentiation and 
association is already summed up. 
In "reproductive rights" we find the presence of two big components and 
of a relationship of bilateral qualification. On the one hand, "reproduction" as an 
event or central action is qualified and delimited by the concept of "rights". On 
the other, "rights" as a social and legal condition confer a specific entitlement, and 
protect the same event that grants them their reference: the process of 
"reproduction". 
The component of "reproduction" finds its basis in biology. It does not 
allude to processes of reproduction in the social, economic, cultural or symbolic 
dimensions but to one that occurs in the sphere of the biological, even when this 
process might be provoked by forces, movements, and events from other spheres 
of life. In addition, the qualification of "rights" points to the fact that elements of 
this process are recognized by the legal or political word. Indeed, from the great 
process of biological reproduction certain aspects and dimensions are identified 
and given life within the sphere of the legal discourse, and others are deemed as 
worthy political projects of civil mobilization and social movements. 
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On this last point it is worthwhile to insist that what creates the 
qualification of "rights" does not have an engulfing effect over the entire process. 
That is, the qualification of "rights" does not transform the whole process of 
reproduction into legal or political discourse. Only some parts and some particular 
instances are targeted by legal thought and chosen by civil organizations and 
social movements. In addition to being a qualification that sets boundaries, 
"rights" is for "reproduction" a mechanism that filters and modifies certain 
elements of the process from the domain of biology to the domain of law, and to 
the domain of social and political struggles. 
From this first look we can already derive at least two dis tinct alternatives 
for the development of research:  
a) What dimensions, elements, or aspects of the process of reproduction have 
been legally recognized and transformed into rights? What are the reasons 
behind the selection of these dimensions, elements, or aspects of 
reproduction? What were the social, political, and cultural conditions that 
allowed and explain the legal recognition of selected dimensions, 
elements, or aspects, and their transformation into rights? 
b) What dimensions, elements, or aspects of the process of reproduction become 
part of political agendas and struggles? Who are the social agents, groups, 
and organizations that acknowledge the need to include and expand or to 
restrict and eliminate reproductive rights? What kind of tactics and 
strategies are used to promote and push for specific agendas? How do 
rights become institutionalized (and de- institutionalized)? 
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In addition to delimiting and qualifying the concept of "reproduction", the 
component of "rights" implies itself a relationship, a relationship that actually 
defines it. The concept of "rights" represents the crystallization of a historically 
grounded process of continuous or discontinuous interactions, exchanges, and 
clashes between state and civil society. That is, "rights" are the juridical product 
of social processes that attempt to negotiate the tension between the needs and 
perspectives of national states and their civil societies. 
The implied relationship in the component of "rights" directly introduces 
the notion of tension. It is a notion that is permanent, because as a source it never 
disappears. Yet, at the same time it is transitive, to the extent that an agreement is 
always possible. It is a social tension with history and a result of different needs 
that, at certain points in time, may or may not be recognized, may or may not be 
open to negotiation. 
In that sense, the qualification that "rights" grants to reproduction should 
be understood, also, as the conceptual inclusion of the two fundamental social 
actors, state and civil society, and the complex social relations that they hold in 
the generation of laws and regulations within a national society, and at a given 
historical period. What the inclusion of state and civil society does, in effect, is to 
raise and acknowledge the social (and if I may, sociological) nature of "rights".  
From this second look, it is possible to propose two additional routes of 
research, that seem to be intimately related to the previous ones: 
c) A first one that has to do with the historical and social reconstruction of the 
formation, formulation, and recognition of reproductive rights within the 
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boundaries of national societies. What were the specific conditions that 
gave birth to them? What were the specific processes that generated the 
possib ilities of their recognition and formulation? What were the social 
needs and political forces behind their recognition and formulation? 
d) A second that is driven by the study of the social agents that participated in 
their formation, formulation, and the possibilities of their social and legal 
recognition. What were the social forces, groups of power, groups of 
representation, and the particular actors that were instrumental to the 
process? What explicit and implicit agendas were put in motion? Which 
were the open and hidden needs that were argued and negotiated? What 
relationship did the particular actors and social groups establish and 
maintain throughout the process?  
2.2.2 The "Reproduction" Component 
As a process, human reproduction is a multidimensional and multifaceted 
phenomenon where vital forces of different orders intervene and whose complex 
dynamics is constituted by the interweaving of multiple domains: biological, 
social, cultural, psychological, linguistic, symbolic, and mythical.  
From a formal point of view, in the process of human reproduction we can 
distinguish three large realms: sexuality, procreation, and rearing (see Chart 1). 
While the realm of procreation is constituted by three events that happen in a 
sequential way and with a successive order (conception, pregnancy, and 
childbirth), in the initial realm (sexuality), and in the terminal one (rearing) the 
constituent events do not present occurrences in a certain order. This is such, that 
 61 
the realm of sexuality like that of rearing can be described, formally speaking, as 
a sequential mesh of simultaneous events, and that of procreation as a trajectory 
of sequential and successive events. 
The first realm, that of sexuality, can be understood as an universe of 
libidinal impulses, symbolic structures, and signifying processes where masses of 
energy, forces, and movement permanently interact to produce the internal logic 
of its dynamics. In this universe we would find an incredibly diverse collection of 
attributes from symbolic and sociolinguistic images like sexual fantasies and 
libidinal repressions; the development of ideas, judgments, and individual forms 
of introjecting and interacting with norms and social controls; ways to symbolize, 
to separate, to administer, and to regulate bodies, activities, and expressions 
according to socially significant differentiation (gender, age, class, and race); 
behavioral expressions like sexual practices and their particular forms of corporal 
manifestation (skin, oral, anal, genital, etc.); elusive terrains like eroticism, 
courtship, and seduction, and even socio-corporal notions like carnal love along 
with its social forms of permissiveness, toleration, and subjection.  
If we turn our attention to the last realm, that of rearing, I would also 
propose to describe it in the same sense: as an universe of emotional bonds, also 
with their symbolic dimensions and signifying processes, where (as is the case 
with sexuality) masses of energy, forces, and movements permanently interact to 
produce the internal logic of its dynamics. In this universe we would also find a 
tremendously diverse group of qualities from the very basic and emotionally 
significant dyadic relationship between children and their parents, and that carry 
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such a heavy representational weight through images, for example, like maternal 
love and paternal responsibility; spaces of communicative and affective 
interactions, of tensions and emotional conflicts, of negotiation of space and 
presence, of identity construction, and of consolidation of self and ego; ongoing 
processes that assure the transmission of perceptual, value, and behavioral 
frameworks like socialization, education, and communicative competence; even 
activities that are both practical and emotional linked to physical care (feeding, 
cleaning, body and health protection, organizing the immediate environment, 
etc.), and also linked to emotional care (affective protection, sentimental 
stimulation, loving, respecting, comforting, etc.). 
An interesting similarity between the realm of sexuality and that of rearing 
(both of which I have assigned a spiral image in Chart 1) has to do with their 
internal dynamics and their processes of development. They both appear as vital 
spaces where a finite series of activities are organized, executed and repeated; 
they are exposed to permanent and changing signifying processes; are constantly 
affected by the historical moments of society, and by the life course events of 
individuals.  
As vital spaces of finite activities, both sexuality and rearing have the 
possibility of being experienced as renovated life processes, and at the same time 
as learning processes. On the one hand, while the activities are well known and 
are experienced repeatedly, either in specific series or articulated in groups, they 
can be experienced as renovated life processes if they are left open or exposed to 
new symbols and new ways of attributing meaning. The activities themselves 
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might not change, but new sets of symbols and forms of interpretation transform 
the ways in which they are lived. On the other, the execution and repetition of 
activities, adjusted to the demands and needs of the life of individuals, and 
developed under certain contextual conditions, can benefit from past experiences 
and, in this sense, can produce the basic cond itions to generate a continuous 
learning process. Thus, both the symbolic renovation and the possibility of 
learning from the past are presented to individuals as options in their everyday life 
experiences, and as ways to guide and interpret those experiences in their lives. 
While sexuality and rearing can be relatively self-contained realms with 
relations, events, forces, and dynamics that maintain certain level of autonomy 
from each other, procreation substantially depends on the existence of each one of 
these realms. Sexuality generates the possibilities of its beginning, through 
conception, and rearing can only be a reality when the experience of procreation 
is complete through a successful birth. From this vantage point, procreation lacks 
relative autonomy, but instead becomes an experiential bridge that connects the 
realms of sexuality and rearing.  
Procreation is constituted by a chain of events with a predetermined 
sequence and within specific ranges of time: childbirth does not happen before 
conception, and pregnancy, that it is taken to term, only happens after conception, 
and it drives to the childbirth. In contrast with sexuality and rearing, procreation is 
a relatively simple process of understanding and of predicting, because it is 
constituted by less variables, its elements have well-known forms of appearing, 
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and because in the constitution of its dynamics there are also less forces that 
intervene. 
The temporal classification of its events and the linearity of their trajectory 
become a natural foundation for the possibility of programming and intervening 
in the process of procreation by different instances of society: family, community, 
and institutions. It is in this sense that procreation can be thought of as a territory, 
within the process of human reproduction, that is open and susceptible to the 
efficiency of normalization and to the diverse systems of social control. To be 
clear, I am not suggesting that sexuality and rearing are realms that escape the 
forces of social normalization - in one way or another, the patterns of behavior, 
the prevalence of traditions, and the existence of legal codes are signs contrary to 
this. Rather, what I am arguing and advancing as a hypothesis, is that from a 
theoretical and formal point of view procreation is, because of the linearity and 
orderly nature of its events, a territory more prone to intervention and 
normalization than the realms of sexuality and rearing. 
Another characteristic that sets procreation apart from the other two 
realms has to do with the cultural signs and social markers of this process. In a 
complete sequence the events of conception, pregnancy, and childbirth produce 
cultural signs that tie the personal experience with social forms of interpretation, 
classifying, and labeling. At the same time, these events produce social markers 
that are visually confirmed by the extended social environment, and that are 
shared by more immediate groups of social membership. These vital experiences 
that have privileged record in the biographies of individuals, become social spaces 
 65 
of public opinion, of moral judgment, of recognition, and of condemnation; their 
visibility transforms the sequence of events into social spaces of intervention. In 
this route of reflection, I do not find fortuitous that, in comparison with the realms 
of sexuality and rearing, it is in the realm of procreation where we find a more 
constant and diverse presence of social rituals, and their associated traditions and 
histories. That is to say, the social visibility of the events in the process of 
procreation has made them good cultural material for the establishment of "rites 
of passage". 
The description and formal analysis of the characteristics of the three 
realms of reproduction and their differences has allowed us to understand their 
qualities and specificities, dynamics and movements, relationships and 
dimensions, and to identify their specific contributions to the process of human 
reproduction.  
To engage and develop this theoretical exercise it has been necessary to 
make abstraction of the social conditions and determinants that affect 
reproduction, in general, and of each one of its realms, in particular. However it 
should be stated with all clarity that the abstraction of this sociological dimension 
has only been a methodological recourse, and in no way is meant as an analytic 
argument. 
To be clear, the process of human reproduction is embedded and deeply 
marked by the systems of social differentiation and inequality of a society 
(age/generation, sex/gender, race/ethnicity, and class). These systems do not only 
work as mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, as forms of prestige and 
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disadvantage, or as ways of assigning activities and distributing responsibilities, 
but in addition as the fundamental conditions that structure the experience itself. 
In this way, the systems of social differentiation and inequality of a society serve 
as normative criteria for the construction of moral judgments about, for example, 
who can "rightfully" exercise their sexuality and when, who can decide to get 
pregnant and under what circumstances, or who should be in charge of rearing 
children. But it also means that belonging to certain social groups (by a 
combination of age, sex, ethnicity/race, and class), at different stages of the life 
course, will generate specific forms of perceiving and of interpreting the events of 
reproduction, and will define the social spaces from where individuals are to live 
(in an advantageous or disadvantageous way) their reproductive experiences. The 
systems of social differentiation and inequality will also define the social territory 
where individuals establish their meaningful relationships, and are able to 
negotiate the circumstances and certain conditions under which they make their 
reproductive decisions. Thus, power relations not only submit, exclude, and 
dominate but also structure social experience. 
2.2.3 The "Rights" Component 
It was in 1968 when reproductive decisions where, for the first time, 
declared as human rights. Article 16 of the Proclamation of Teheran established 
that all decisions concerning the number of children and their spacing should 
occur under conditions of freedom, and be taken responsibly. Subsequently it was 
ratified in 1969 by the Declaration of Social Progress and Development (articles 4 
and 22), as well as by other decrees thereafter. It became part of the Convention 
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on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (article 16, 
section 1e), that was passed in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly, 
and forced as a convent ion in 1981 (United Nations Secretariat, 1990). 
The core elements of the international definition of reproductive rights 
were established during that eleven year period and were materialized in the 
Convention’s document. Article 16(1e) resolves that “State Parties … shall 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women … the same rights to decide 
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have 
access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these 
rights” (Boland, R., 1997; CRLP, 2000). 
From its emergence in the late sixties the formulation has undergone four 
types of changes that are worth noting. The first was in regard to the category of 
persons possessing the rights. It was transformed multiple times from the decade 
of the sixties to that of the eighties. The figure of entitlement shifted from 
“family” and  “parents” at the beginning of the period, and settled on “couples 
and individuals” in 1984  (International Conference on Population, in Mexico 
City). The second change occurs during the eighties and throughout the nineties,  
when the concept of  “responsibility” is qualified to mean “consideration of the 
needs of living and future children as well as a recognition of community 
responsibilities.” The third and fourth change take place in the nineties and 
through various international conferences. On the one hand, while being ratified 
in its core elements, the definition is largely enhanced to include the “right to 
attain the highest standard of sexua l and reproductive health.” On the other, a 
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human rights maxim is asserted as the right “to make decisions concerning 
reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence” (Boland, R., 1997; 
CRLP, 2000; Dixon-Mueller, 1993; Petchesky, 1998). 
I will analyze the meaning and the effects of those changes over the 
international discourse and the interpretation of reproductive rights in the next 
section. For the time being, however, I would like to turn to the analysis of the 
central definition (and its core elements) that was established in 1979 and has 
been ratified since then numerous times through international conferences and 
forums. 
Reproductive rights are by nature multidimensional because they involve 
more than one moment and more than one decision. They are defined centrally by 
three dimensions: the decision to have a child, the decision of when to have a 
child, and the decision of regulating ones fertility. That is, they are rights that 
enable decisions about the possibility of progeny, and decisions in regard to ones 
own body. 
Furthermore, reproductive rights are social rights (as we will see later on) 
because they imply and require the presence of a national state. The full and free 
exercise of the reproductive rights of individual citizens imply and require the 
presence of their national state in functions of supervision, protection, regulation, 
administration, service, and provision. 
If we subject the fundamental postulates that define reproductive rights to 
the analysis of reproduction thus far advanced, it is possible to reveal some 
interesting characteristics. First, what has been enacted as reproductive rights in 
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the world of international declarations is circumscribed to the realm of 
procreation. Second, it is the possibility to decide about procreation, that is, to 
decide about conception, pregnancy, and childbirth what is essentially enabled 
and protected by these rights. Third, being that the decisions on the events of 
procreation are the moral and legal center of reproductive rights, what ultimately 
matters is the enabling and protection of the capacity to make those decisions. 
Finally, it is not enough to enable and protect the capacity to make the decisions. 
The decisions made need to be enacted in an environment of material quality, 
required services, and under an absolute respect of the social diversity and 
identity of the individuals involved. 
To the extent that "reproductive rights" are concentrated in the events of 
conception, pregnancy, and childbirth to that extent is that there is a legal 
exclusion of the realms of sexuality and rearing. Both in the international norms 
and in their national translations, reproduction is not only defined as the 
conceptual equivalent of procreation, but it consequently implies the absence of 
sexuality and rearing in the legal discourse of "reproductive rights". 
Indeed, the possible links that we can trace between  "reproductive rights" 
and the realms of sexuality and rearing are, in any event, secondary. With the 
realm of sexuality the link is established through the institutional functions of 
formal instruction such as: a) access to information about sexual and reproductive 
physiology; b) the right to receive relevant information from qualified personnel 
and institutional services, when required and needed; c) access to medical 
information and services in sexual health, and d) access to preventive and curative 
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technologies. In the case of rearing, the possible links are even scarcer and 
weaker, whereas they depend on the existence of other rights, such as labor rights. 
The access to childcare services and maternity leaves, for example, are granted 
only to women that work in those sectors protected by specific legislation. 
From this analysis I would like to make a twofold argument. On the one 
hand, it is important to acknowledge the discursive disparity between 
"reproductive rights" and their current effect of enabling only rights connected to 
the events of procreation. Not because I am suggesting we should reduce the legal 
terrain of their influence or confine them to be only procreative rights. But, to 
point out their current limitations and the need to expand their protection beyond 
the limits of procreation, to areas and elements in the realms of sexuality and 
rearing. On the other hand, however, I believe it would be a mistake to subsume 
the entire realms of sexuality and rearing to the legal protection of "reproductive 
rights". The fact that "reproductive rights" have international recognition and 
protection does not mean that they are capable of responding to the needs of rights 
connected with sexuality and rearing or that they should be a protective legal 
umbrella of these two realms. Reproduction while obviously linked with sexuality 
and rearing should continue to be kept separate from these two realms. Sexual 
rights and the rights involved in the rearing of children require their own analyses 
and deserve separate processes of recognition and entitlement. 
2.3 ENTITLEMENT,  RESPONSIBILITY, AND INEQUALITY 
Entitlement is a crucial aspect of the discursive and legal constitution of a 
right. The determination and assignment of entitlements for human rights has 
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normally been a straightforward and relatively uncomplicated process. This, 
however, has not been the case for reproductive rights. In this section I will 
explore the reasons of this unique discursive and legal history. Additionally, I will 
explore the "social character" of reproductive rights, the concept of responsibility 
in their definition, and the meaning that social inequality has for the possibilities 
of their exercise. 
2.3.1 Entitlement and Its Transformations  
From their inception the transformations that reproductive rights have 
undergone have been fundamentally tied to the definition of their entitlement. 
Who is the subject of these rights? Do reproductive rights protect and entitle 
individuals, couples, parents or families? Who should be the beneficiary of these 
rights, women, men, couples, parents, or families? These were the kind of 
questions that lead the discussions and the efforts to define the persons that 
possessed these rights. 
While in the mid 60s the family was perceived to be the social unit who 
should be the the recipient of these rights, by 1968 this figure had been replaced 
by parents, however. During the 70s the entitlement was changed to that of the 
couple, and remained this way until the mid-80s. Currently, however, entitlement 
has moved away from the idea of the family or parents as the central recipient, has 
established the couple as a basic unit, and has fundamentally enhanced the 
definition to include, protect, and empower individuals as well (Boland, R., 1997; 
CRLP, 2000; Dixon-Mueller, 1993; Fincancioglu, 1990). 
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The need for the first mayor transformation in the entitlement can be 
readily understood because the family was a very imprecise and diffuse legal 
reference, and because it allowed the inclusion of people not directly involved in 
the process of reproduction. The imprecision had to do with the own definition of 
family and its variations across societies and cultures. But the central concern was 
that entitling the family jeopardized the autonomy and self-determination of those 
individuals directly involved in the decisions regarding reproduction. These 
problems made the abandonment of the figure of the family a logical move, but 
replacing it with parents opened up another series of problems. 
The choice of entitling parents over families was by comparison a better 
choice, to the extent that it granted rights to persons directly involved in the 
process of reproduction, but it was an ambiguous alternative because it introduced 
a troubling exclusion. This form of entitlement made parenthood a prerequisite to 
these rights, disabling their enjoyment and exercise as a way to delay or avoid 
parenthood all together. While formally this change moved away from the 
intervention of a diffuse yet powerful set of kin related people in the decisions 
about reproduction, it still made basic assumptions about the constitution of 
families through reproduction. In this way, parenthood was not presented as a 
choice but as a normative assumption. 
 The multiple steps from entitling the family, and then parents, to entitling 
couples represented an evolution toward a more precise reference. People not 
directly involved in the process of reproduction were left outside the domain of 
decisions, and parenthood was no longer assumed as a condition for granting 
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these rights. However, the entitlement of couples was still problematic to the 
extent that the autonomy of individuals, in particular of women, was relativized 
and not protected. Granting the entitlement to couples assumed equal standing, 
participation, and responsibility in reproduction. This assumption is highly 
problematic given the social dynamics of gender power relations. The changes in 
entitlement and the demands for further specification required a much more 
complex discussion, however. 
The fundamental concern can be summarized in the following way. Under 
patriarchal structures of social organization gender relations disable women in the 
exercise of their rights. Gender relations create a constant and systematic 
disadvantage for women that prevent them from making decisions about 
reproduction, and from exercising their rights in an autonomous way across 
different social spheres and throughout the ir life courses.  
In light of this problem of a sociological order, the response, however, was 
not sociological but from the domain of legal discourse. Since gender relations 
put women at a disadvantage, the solution rested - it was thought- in originating 
rights and entitlements capable of counteracting or reversing that situation. The 
question was how best to design rights and curtail their entitlements so as to grant 
women differential legal power, as a way of equalizing with men their capacity to 
make decisions and of protecting them from male domination. Women required 
legal protection and a discourse capable of empowering them during the decision 
making process, and in the exercise of their reproductive rights. 
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A route chosen proposed modifications in the definition of entitlement. 
Rights should be granted first and foremost to individual women, and only then 
should they be extended to their couple or significant other. The intention was to 
privilege women over men, to create the legal structures to empower them as 
decision-makers and to fortify the possibility for them to exercise their rights. The 
problem was how to justify this unequal entitlement of two individuals 
participating in the same process. The argument found suggested that this was 
justifiable to the extent that the participation of women and men in the process of 
reproduction was not at all equal. While genetically men participate as much as 
women during conception, from a biological point of view women have the 
central role and carry a larger responsibility during pregnancy and birth. Thus 
women are fundamental for the most part of the process of reproduction; an 
experience that has no parallel in the life of men. Because of this fact and the right 
to self-determination over one's own body, women -it was argued- should have a 
primordial place in the definition of reproductive rights and their entitlements 
(Azzolini, A., 1993; De Barbieri, T., 1994 Fincancioglu, N., 1990; Macklin, R., 
1990). 
This type of argumentation has the grave problem of supporting, 
unintentionally all be it, social practices and reinforcing reasoning of a patriarchal 
character. On the one hand, by centering the decision only on one person 
(childbearing women) it minimizes the participation, responsibility, and 
accountability of the other member of the reproductive couple, and all potential 
contributions to the decision-making process and the enrichment of the 
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experience. This exclusion is also unfortunate because it diminishes the 
importance that decisions can (and should) be a product of communicative 
processes between both members of the reproductive couple, where individual 
rights are exercised freely and responsibilities are shared equally. Communicative 
processes, that are intersubjective, not only allow for mutual understanding of 
desires and needs, but in addition they are a very effective tool for solving 
conflicting ideas, positions, plans, and needs. On the other, the attribution of 
rights represents, at the same time, attribution of obligations. In this sense, to 
privilege childbearing women in the entitlement has, also, the subtext of making 
procreation, from beginning to end, their exclusive responsibility. A normative 
route that was conceived as a counterbalance to gender inequality and as a way to 
empower women in the decision-making process turned out to work against 
women. By excluding men (or the other member of the reproductive couple), it 
impoverishes our conceptions of reproductive decision-making processes. And 
while the design of the entitlement might grant women a certain "legal edge", the 
overall consequence is, in effect, disempowering because it places the whole 
burden of procreation (yet again) solely on women, pretty much in the fashion 
that patriarchal reasoning has done for such a long time.  
The fact that men and women have a biologically different participation in 
reproduction, and that there are social practices that systematically discriminate 
against women does not mean that the remedy, from a normative point of view, is 
to construct discriminatory rights or exclusionary entitlements. If the objective is 
to create social conditions of gender equality and to grant equal rights within 
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couples and for individuals, this does not seem to be the route. I believe that the 
problem stems from confusing the normative dimension with the sociological. It 
is problematic, at best, to give a normative solution to a sociological problem 
without recognizing the complex relationship these dimensions hold, and the 
limits that each one has to produce changes in the other.  
The international definition of reproductive rights mitigated the problem 
and deferred the debate by extending the entitlement to include both the couple 
and individuals involved in the process of reproduction. The more substantive 
debate, however, about how to face and deal with the issue of gender inequality, 
when defining entitlements and rights, remained open until the mid 1990s.  
Three consecutive international conferences (1993: World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna, 1994: International Conference on Population and 
Development in Cairo, and 1995: Fourth World Conference on Women in 
Beijing) had a definitive effect over the orientation and content of the debate by 
moving it away from the domain of entitlement. The problem of gender inequality 
for the exercise of reproductive rights was no longer seen as resolvable through a 
normative transformation of entitlement. It was no longer a battle about formally 
empowering women in an effort to equalize the conditions under which 
reproductive decisions were made. Now the goal was about embedding the notion 
of gender equality as a necessary condition for reproductive decisions and the 
exercise of reproductive rights. This resulted in a substantive and profound 
change that, in my estimation, transformed the entire landscape of the debate by 
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shifting the framework of reference and interpretation, and positively responding 
to the need of facing the problem of gender inequality. 
Paragraph 96 of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, can be 
read as a crystallization of that process: “The human rights of women include 
their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters 
related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of 
coercion, discrimination and violence. Equal relationships between women and 
men in matters of sexual relations and reproduction, including full respect for the 
integrity of the person, require mutual respect, consent and shared responsibility 
for sexual behavior and its consequences” (United Nations, 1995).  
I agree with Rosalind Petchesky when she refers to this as an historic 
international recognition (1998). It represents a conceptual and political landmark 
because it established the social need for gender equality beyond the previously 
recognized public realms. Equal relations between men and women need to be 
assured, protected, and fostered in the private sphere, and in the specific realms of  
family, reproduction, and intimacy for women’s human rights to self-
determination and equality to excel and flourish. This international recognition 
makes gender equality a social issue that cuts across all spheres of life. 
2.3.2 Social Character of Entitlement and the Concept of Responsibility 
From a historical and formal point of view, reproductive rights should be 
included simultaneously under two different categories of human rights: as 
individual rights and social rights. On the one hand, the right to decide how many, 
when, or whether to have children is the expression of an individual right to 
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reproductive freedom. It is predicated on the notion of individual liberty, and it 
implies the right to control one's own body. On the other, the right to have the 
information and means to regulate (or not) one's own fertility is the expression of 
a right to social goods. Regardless of the choices people make in regard to their 
fertility, all individuals have the right to the most current and accurate 
information, and to the most effective and safe means for the regulation of their 
fertility. 
This connection to both the domains of individual and social rights creates 
an interesting duality. It introduces a tension between the individual freedom to 
choose and the conditions that need to be met for that choice to be significant and 
meaningful. In other words, it establishes the need to assure access to certain 
social goods as a condition for reproductive freedom. 
Ruth Dixon-Mueller describes that dual characteristic in the following 
way:  
The individual liberty elements consist of the freedom to choose among 
alternative sexual and reproductive behaviors without coercion from 
governments or from individuals or social institutions ... The social 
entitlement elements consist of the obligation of the state, or of "society," 
to ensure that everyone can exercise the full range of economic, social, 
political, and civil rights that infuse reproductive choice with real meaning 
(1993:14-15). 
The inclusion of reproductive decisions as rights of citizens in the World 
Plan of Action in Population of 1974 established two types of obligations for 
national governments. First, governments cannot interfere nor inhibit the 
decision-making processes of their citizens with regard to reproduction, either 
through mechanisms of coercion or the concealment of the necessary information 
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for making reproductive decisions. Reproductive decisions are the exclusive and 
sovereign domain of citizens, and it is the obligation of the state, or the 
governments in turn, to assure that they are protected and kept this way. Second, 
governments have the obligation to provide the necessary information so citizens 
can make knowledgeable decisions, as well as to provide the means for those 
decisions to materialize in the best way possible (Fincancioglu, N., 1990; 
Hartmann, B., 1987; Warwick, D., 1982). 
As Dixon Mueller points out,  
the role of governments, ideally, is to balance in practice the sometimes 
contradictory demands of individual freedom and social entitlement as 
abstractly defined ... Too little state intervention can make it impossible 
for people to decide freely on the number and spacing of their children, for 
example, because they lack the economic resources, information, and 
services to do so or because their rights are violated by other individuals 
or groups. Too much intervention can infringe on individual choice in the 
name of collective security or the common good (1993:15). 
All rights require a social environment of freedom and respect, or to put it 
in a negative sense, require the absence of all forms of coercion. However and 
unlike individual rights, social rights are by definition rights that are also 
dependent on specific conditions for their exercise to be possible. The lack of 
these conditions constitutes direct impediments to their expression and exercise: 
without hospitals, schools, and a productive plant it renders impossible to exercise 
the right to health, to education, and to work. Social rights establish a binding 
contract of the state towards civil society. They imply duties and responsibilities 
for governments of provid ing the means and conditions so their populations can 
fully exercise their rights as citizens of their societies. In this sense, the social 
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rights of a population are dependent on their state's provision and enabling 
intervention. 
What is unique about reproductive rights, is that without being exclusively 
social rights their individual dimension require access to social goods 
(information and means), and a social agreement to protect their autonomy from 
individuals, groups, social institutions, and particularly from government itself. 
Why would an internationally supported plan of action (like the on e 
elaborated in 1974) obligate national governments not to interfere in the 
reproductive decisions of their citizens, by way of coercive measures? Why would 
governments feel the need to intervene in the reproductive decisions of their 
citizens? The normative effort could have been a response to governments that 
were violating the reproductive freedom of their citizens or an anticipation of that 
possibility. Whether the intention was corrective or preventive, the most 
interesting issue, it seems to me, is that it was perceived to be a problem that 
required addressing.  
While a liberal framework for international law would require that all 
governments respect the reproductive freedom of their citizens, the World Plan of 
1974 set out to obligate national governments not to be coercive, even if they felt 
it was justifiable in the name of the common good. In the 1970s population 
growth had already been articulated as a major obstacle, if not the central reason, 
for the lack of social and economic development in the so-called "Third World" 
countries. Governments that were concerned about their population growth could 
only see certain type of reproductive decisions as good for the nation. 
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Reproductive decisions could not be made disregarding the "needs of the nation"; 
otherwise citizenship freedom would be used irresponsibly. In this sense, 
reproductive freedom was at odds with national development projects, and 
ultimately with the common good. Reproductive decisions needed to be not only 
free --it was thought-- but also responsible. 
Since their inception, reproductive rights have been accompanied by the 
idea of responsibility. But the concept was not fully defined until 1974 through 
the World Plan of Action in Population. According to that formulation, and in the 
absence of later modifications to this date, responsibility is introduced as a 
qualifier to the exercise of reproductive freedom. Couples and individuals need to 
take into consideration their situation, as well as the implications of their 
decisions for the development of their children, their community, and their 
society. A revision of the concept in 1984 added that a responsible decision would 
also require taking into account the well-being of future children (United Nations, 
1990; Boland, R., 1997). 
Defined in that way, the inclusion of the concept of responsibility within 
reproductive rights seems to create an intrinsic contradiction. "Does the 
recognition of the needs of the community, and of society justify the intervention 
of the state where fertility decision-making processes take place? If the answer is 
affirmative, to what degree and in what way? This fundamental topic continues 
being debated in the different instances of the United Nations" (United Nations 
Secretariat, 1990:59). 
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While the Cairo Conference in 1994 resulted in important modifications to 
the interpretation of reproductive rights and meaningful enhancements of its 
domain, it is somewhat noteworthy that in its core elements the international 
definition has remained (the entitlement figure being the exception) as it was 
formulated in 1968 and reformulated in 1979. This includes the concept of 
responsibility, and its subsequent qualifiers. In effect, the Cairo Program of 
Action “moved reproductive rights away from only family planning and access to 
these services towards a broader focus on sexual and reproductive health … It 
also emphasized the principle that the right to reproductive self-determination is a 
right that is to be exercised freely, without discrimination, violence, or coercion” 
(Boland, R., 1997: 16). Both of these modifications were not only ratified but 
further developed and specified in 1995 at the Beijing Conference and in its 
Program of Action. 
In light of all these modifications that have enhanced reproductive rights, 
it is quite remarkable and somewhat unsettling that the concept of responsibility 
has not been challenge or changed in any way. 
The inclusion and permanence of the idea of responsibility in the 
definition of reproductive rights can be interpreted-- I am suggesting --as a 
product of a political compromise between state interventionists and reproductive 
rights defenders. From the state's perspective it can work as a corrective to 
“deviant behavior” and as an avenue to protect the discretionary power to 
intervene when the project of the nation is threatened. From the rights' perspective 
it situates the whole decision-making process in the sphere of individual freedom, 
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and therefore under the control of individuals and couples, including the 
interpretation of what is best for their communities and societies. But neither the 
tension nor the contradictions disappear. 
The rights' perspective has always manifested a concern with state 
intervention in the decision-making processes of individuals and couples. And 
while there has been a certain level of consensus around the idea of restricting this 
type of state intervention, the concept of responsibility has produced debate and 
divisions. The discussion has been divided in two fronts: those that support an 
initiative where the boundaries of freedom and responsibility are clearly 
delineated and, those that believe in the omission of the concept of responsibility 
from the international definition. The first position understands the problem as 
transitory: the source of conflict is a direct result of the lack of conceptual clarity. 
All that is required is a clear definition of where freedom ends and responsibility 
begins. A clearly established definition of responsibility-- they would argue-- not 
only would restrict state intervention, but would obligate individuals to think in 
terms of the common good. In contrast, the second position defends the idea that 
individuals having the means and the necessary knowledge will achieve 
reproductive decisions in accordance not only to their needs, but to their social 
reality as well. Thus, there is no need to establish responsibility beforehand 
because the decisions would be contextually situated responding differentially to 
different sectors of the population. Of course, this assumes that the project of the 
nation would be receptive and inclusive of a wide array of reproductive decisions, 
and would respect the content of those decisions. 
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To what extent, then, is it a wise idea that an international definition of 
reproductive rights include the concept of responsibility? Is it possible to 
reconcile the freedom of individuals and couples with the needs of their 
communities, their societies, and their nation states? Should there even be an 
effort to reconcile differences between these spheres? And if so, is the concept of 
responsibility capable of achieving this? 
The debates surrounding the concept of responsibility have suggested that 
there are different plausible interpretations of the concept, and that these can lead 
to dramatically different expressions of reproductive rights. Furthermore, I 
believe that the opposing interpretations of the concept of responsibility are 
symptoms of conceptual contradictions that are not only worth exploring but that 
need to be faced and solved. 
The fact that the concept of responsibility is still part of the international 
definition of reproductive rights, and that it still remains without clarification has, 
in my opinion, serious implications. In its current form, the concept of 
responsibility allows states to intervene "legitimately" in the reproductive 
decisions of their citizens, on the grounds that their decisions or actions are 
irresponsible. The scenario is not a difficult one to imagine. A governmental plan 
evaluates the possible implications of a certain rate of population growth as 
negative for the economic development and future viability of the nation. Fertility 
is identified as the variable that has the most weight in producing that population 
growth, and contraception as the most effective tool to bring down the fertility 
rate. Caring about the future of the nation the government would organize efforts 
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and structure plans with the objective of reversing the trend and avoiding its 
negative consequences. In this way fertility is linked to economic development 
and high fertility is perceived to be an obstacle to a better future. Contraception 
and reproductive choices become the social space where government meets 
citizens, the administrative and political "battle ground" where decisions will be 
sanctioned as responsible or not. How much a government is willing to push for 
what they have determined to be a "responsible" decision, and to encroach on the 
autonomy of individuals and couples will ultimately depend on how authoritarian 
or democratic a country is. But an active government that "cares" about the future 
of the nation will aggressively pursue administrative goals, becoming a permanent 
threat to free and autonomous reproductive decisions. 
Without a clear international definition, the interpretation that 
governments make of the concept of responsibility will be dependent on the 
prevailing political culture and the political relations of that society. At the center 
of this question we have the problem of the potential or real contradiction 
between state needs and the needs of social groups and individuals; of how 
tolerant of difference and even of dissent governments are; of how important the 
autonomy and freedom of citizens is to governments, and how representative the 
administration of state is of the will of the people (see Chart 2). Also at the center 
is the crucial problem of how and who defines, at certain historical junctions, 
what is a national need, what is in the best interest of a nation, and what 
constitutes a social and political priority. Ultimately, it is about how democratic a 
society is, and how participatory and representative the political system really is. 
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Population policies are specific and historical expressions of how states 
and governments interpret the relation between development and demographic 
phenomena. In turn, the establishment of demographic goals are quantitative ways 
in which the interpretation of that relation is translated into plans and programs. It 
is the state and its concrete governments who determines what is the best 
population scenario for the development of the nation, and who designs it into 
programmatic practice. It is within this interpretative frame that reproductive 
responsibility is contextually defined. 
Given the centrality of fertility for population growth, demographic goals 
find their translations into fertility level goals, regardless if the intention is to 
reduce or increase growth. The national goal for population growth becomes a 
national goal for fertility, and from there an ideal number of children to have. The 
establishment of demographic goals and their translation into number of children 
sets the normative boundaries for reproduction, and determines in a numerical 
form the criteria for responsible reproductive behavior.  
The free exercise of reproductive rights is defined and determined within 
these programmatically fixed limits. Anything outside these limits might be 
considered from an individual or couple's perspective a free decision, an 
unconstrained reproductive act, but from the perspective of the state it is deemed 
as irresponsible, or at best as a reproductive freedom used irresponsibly. In this 
way, responsibility appears as the process by which individuals and couples 
incorporate in their reproductive decisions the historical "needs of the nation". It 
is not enough, for individuals and couples, to take into consideration their 
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situation, as well as the implications of their decisions for the development and 
well-being of their (current and future) children, a responsible decision will 
require considering and incorporating the “demographic demands” and the 
“developmental needs” of their community and their society, such that the 
decision itself reflects the “needs of the nation”. Because no other sphere provides 
such a precise measure to judge a reproductive decision as do population policies 
and their demographic goals, ultimately it is the "needs of the nation", expressed 
in a programmatic ideal number of children to have, that provides the criteria for 
responsibility. The concept of responsibility becomes the metamorphosis of the 
will of the state into individual will; it creates the precise limits within which 
women and men, couples can be sanctioned as "free and responsible" when 
exercising their rights and making their reproductive decisions. 
Whether or not the inclusion of the concept of responsibility was a product 
of a political compromise, its presence results in a lopsided definition that favors 
state intervention and disempowers citizens in the exercise of their reproductive 
rights. The lack of a definitive and forceful challenge to rid the definition of the 
concept of responsibility may suggest a tacit agreement with the need for state 
intervention and a patronizing politics: "People can't be trusted to do the right 
thing, to make adequate reproductive decisions; that is why we have to appeal to 
their sense of obligation and force them to be responsible for their own 
reproductive actions. And if people can't be trusted, who is going to assure the 
nation’s future?" 
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Even in the absence of this last perverse political possibility, I believe 
there are enough reasons to completely eliminate the concept of responsibility 
from the international definition of reproductive rights. The concept of 
responsibility allows, invites, and justifies state intervention; it reflects a politics 
of disdain and not of trust, and it advocates normalization and intolerance rather 
than respect and acceptance of reproductive diversity. 
2.3.3 Entitlement, Inequality, and the Exercise of Rights 
Due to the universal criteria that defines the concept of justice in a society, 
all individuals are equal. They are equal because the only condition that an 
individual requires to be entitled to laws and regulations, and to the protection of 
a system of justice is to be a member of that society (Lummis, 1992). 
From a strictly formal perspective, "if the same norms and rules are 
applied to each and every one of the members of a society (independently of the 
social group to which they belong), these norms and rules make all equal from the 
point of view of the norms and rules in question" (Heller, 1987:16). It is the social 
existence of a system of laws and their pervasive application what allows all 
citizens in a formal democracy to be members of that society. A system of laws 
provides equal rights and equality of all citizens under them. In turn, citizenship 
appears as the legal form of social membership (Lummis, 1992).  
In the particular case of reproductive rights, all individuals are entitled to 
the inalienable rights over their own bodies, and to be able to decide freely about 
their fertility and when or whether to have children. The only condition that they 
require is having been born in this world, for they are international rights granted 
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to all human beings. Furthermore, if individuals were born in a country where 
these rights are protected legally, that is to say, where the condition of being a 
citizen allows for the translation of a human right into a constitutional right, then 
their national state will have the obligation of assuring that the circumstances are 
suitable for the free and full exercise of reproductive decisions. From this vantage 
point, the citizens of the world that are also citizens of these nations turn out to 
hold a rights' privilege because they have a double legal and moral protection, one 
from an international legal frame and from a national one as well. These citizens 
would have "doubly" insured the entitlement to rights that seek to safeguard their 
reproductive life. 
However, the fact that belonging to a society will grant individuals with a 
series of rights and obligations, and that these will work as equalizers between all 
individuals of that society, does not mean that all will have the same possibilities 
or be in equality of circumstances to exercise those rights that (formally) define 
them all as equal. Having rights does not mean that one can exercise them. 
Between the entitlement to a formal right that all individuals have due to their 
membership to a society and the possibility of their exercise stand social 
constraints specific to that society (structural, systemic, ideological, symbolic).  
In contemporary societies, social inequality is foundational to social 
relations and central to the organization of social life and opportunities. The 
system of inequality in a given society changes from one historical period to 
another, and is a product of a complex articulation of different (sub)systems of 
social inequality based on class, gender, race and ethnicity, and age. The weight 
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that each one of these (sub)systems has on the profile of the overall stratification 
and inequality depends on the specific history and internal dynamics of a society. 
These complex articulations are unique to the social formation of each society, yet 
they are permanently undergoing transformations and re-articulations (Andersen 
and Collins, 1992; Marger, 1999; Ore, 2000; Rosenblum and Travis, 1996.) 
Social inequality, as a result of these complex articulations, determines the 
manner in which individuals participate in the production and benefit from the 
distribution of social wealth, as well as the structure of options within which 
individuals construct their lives and exercise their personal will. And, conversely, 
in the exercise of their personal will and the construction of their lives individuals 
create and re-create the structure of options and the related social determinations, 
as well as their own insertion into the production and distribution of social wealth 
(Bourdieu, 1977 & 1990; Giddens, 1984; Habermas, 1984 & 1987; Luhmann and 
De Georgi, 1993). 
Trying to explain the relationship of multiple determinations between 
agency and structure, Giddens uses the concept of duality to assess that unique 
characteristic and quality of all social structures: "Structure (is) the medium and 
outcome of the conduct it recursively organises; the structural properties of social 
systems do not exist outside of action but are chronically implicated in its 
production and reproduction" (1984, p.374). 
It is not only that people's actions are constantly confronted by social 
structures or that social structures permanently impose constraints over people's 
actions, but also that the different (sub)systems of inequality (class, gender, race 
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and ethnicity, and age) have a foundational effect over the relationship that people 
and social groups establish with each other. The action of individuals and groups, 
as well as the multiple constraints of social structure operate through the mesh of 
social inequality and its different (sub)systems.  
Consequently, the exercise of rights happens in accordance with the 
options and conditions arranged by the relative position that individuals and 
groups occupy within the mesh of (sub)systems of social inequality. The 
specificity of the exercise of those rights, then, is generated by the exercise of 
personal will within the context of the options that social inequality offers to 
individuals and groups. 
All individuals are equal under the law because as citizens of a nation they 
are entitled to the same rights. This equality is only but formal; as members of a 
society their equal entitlement does not assure equal enjoyment. The formal 
equality is completely shattered when equal rights are realized as unequal 
exercise, and equal entitlement becomes unequal enjoyment. For some individuals 
the exercise of rights will happen in a social environment full of possibilities, and 
saturated with diverse alternatives. For others, the choices will be given in a 
context of restricted possibilities, and a small array of alternatives. For yet others, 
the choice might not even be a possibility. 
Although formally all citizens of a nation, that recognizes reproductive 
rights, are entitled to the same set of rights not all will be able to exercise them in 
a context of multiple options and diverse alternatives; some will not even have a 
chance to exercise them at all. For example, if we take the issue of access to 
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medical services, we find that some citizens will be able to choose a specialized, 
highly qualified, and private medical practice according to their resources, and the 
amount of money they are willing to pay for them. Others will be immediately 
precluded from these options because resources cannot be made readily available 
for these purposes; they will be obligated to make use of services partial or totally 
subsidized and provided by state institutions. Yet others, in stark contrast, will be 
excluded from access to reproductive medical services all together. 
In the previous example, the effect of social inequality over access to 
medical services is presented as a problem linked to economic resources. But the 
issue is larger than economic resources and has crucial effects over other 
important dimensions of the possibility of exercising reproductive rights and the 
social experience involved in that exercise. Taking into account variations across 
social contexts, having access to a private medical service or only to a public one 
is gaining access to two very different medical environments. Aside from the 
issues of quality and specialization that are affected by economic resources, each 
one of the environments will produce very distinct experiences due to differences 
in the type of physician-patient relationship, normative practices, institutional 
orientations, social expectations, sense of entitlement, and capacity for 
negotiation.  
Also the dynamics of the interaction might be altered in ways that affect 
the quality of the experience, and the decision making process. Allowing for 
social and cultural variations, physicians in a private practice, for example, will 
tend to view their patients as clients that need to be catered to, and perhaps make 
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efforts to preserve the clientilistic relationship to the extent that they are 
personally profiting from it. This might translate into a more receptive physician 
to the specific needs and demands of the patient. In turn, a patient that has 
purchased a service might feel more empowered to expect and demand a certain 
level of quality, that would range anywhere from the amount and type of 
information demanded to feeling comfortable when accepting or declining a 
medical suggestion or procedure. This sense of empowerment could work as a 
potentiating force of the level and quality of the information the person brings 
into the medical service, and would allow for arriving at a reproductive decision 
more suited to the life and the needs of the patient. 
Access to medical services is only but one area of the whole set of 
reproductive rights. Although in different ways, all areas are affected by social 
inequality once we place entitlement within a specific social context and we 
explore the differential possibilities that citizens would have of actualizing these 
rights. 
The vital social experience of individuals permanently questions the level 
of feasibility of formal equality granted by the law, and it challenges the notion 
that formal equality translates in anyway into the social conditions of their every 
day life existence. Legal discourse defends not only that all citizens are equal 
under the law, but even that all citizens have equal possibilities of enjoying and 
exercising all rights, as well as being equally protected by the law. Formal 
equality encounters stark forms of inequality; the all inclusive promise of rights 
clashes with the pervasive forms of exclusion and marginalization creating a 
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schizophrenic split between the discursive promises of the law and the social 
experiences of individuals. 
2.4 REPRODUCTIVE DECISIONS: A NORMATIVE AND SOCIOLOGICAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Using a Habermasian methodology, this section explores the concept of 
reproductive rights in two analytical dimensions: as a normative phenomenon and 
as a sociological reality. The analysis is developed from the perspective of the 
decision-making process involved. The international definition of reproductive 
rights is based on a series of complex assumptions about decisions pertaining to 
reproduction. I start by briefly presenting the basic assumptions of this definition, 
and reconstruct the meaning these assumptions have for decisions. Then, I 
propose an ideal process of reproductive decision-making as a normative frame 
for reproductive rights. Once I have established the ideal normative process, in the 
final part of this section I turn my attention to the identification and analysis of 
possible disturbances. By disturbances I mean the social, political, and economic 
conditions that interfere with the development of an ideal process of decision-
making. Two main sources of disturbances are assessed for both the private and 
the public realms: power relations and systems of social inequality. 
2.4.1 On the Assumptions  
According to the components that define the legal parameters of 
reproductive rights in a national context or a specific country, certain conditions 
are required so that these rights can be fully exercised by their citizens. On the 
one hand, the state is under the obligation of providing to its population of 
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current, truthful, general and specific information, as well as the appropriate 
means for the regulation of fertility. On the other, in order for citizens to carry out 
their reproductive decisions freely, the state should not only abstain from 
intervening in the process of decision-making but in addition make sure that the 
social conditions that surround this process allows for the generation of 
autonomous decisions (Boland, R., 1997; CRLP, 2000; Dixon-Mueller, 1993; 
Petchesky, 1998; United Nations, 1990 & 1995) . 
In that sense, the state plays the double role of general supplier and of 
guardian of the freedom and autonomy of its citizens. That is why the full 
exercise of reproductive rights, in particular, but of all the social rights, in general, 
depends on concrete provisions and actions from the state to assure autonomy and 
freedom. While the role of supplier is directly tied to the availability and 
distribution of resources, the role of guardian is more closely linked to political 
will and the relationship it has with civil society. For the provision of information 
and means the state requires material and human resources, but their availability 
does not assure that the state has the political will of distributing them or that 
society has access to them; resources are a necessary condition but they are not 
enough to satisfy the obligation of providing or the need for the provision. In 
contrast, for the protection of autonomy and freedom in the exercise of citizens' 
rights, the state is required to have an unrestricted respect for their private 
processes and to trust that their decisions will ultimately be good for the nation, 
regardless if they approve or not of them. In anyone of the two cases, the key 
resides in that the state is able to recognize the political virtue of one of the 
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maxims of democracy: ultimately, the power of the state is located in civil 
society, and in the decisions that citizens make. These, of course, can be 
expressed as preferences while voting, while determining what is the common 
good or through intersubjective public deliberations. 
The full exercise of the reproductive rights of the citizens of a nation can 
only be developed in relation with the state: on the basis of its provisions and 
under the help of its guardianship. 
The legal definition of reproductive rights and their exp lanatory 
(international) discourse has been constructed on the basis of a series of normative 
assumptions that are not, necessarily, made explicit or submitted to analytical and 
public scrutiny. Nevertheless, these assumptions have greatly informed and 
guided their interpretation. In this way, for example, the right to make free and 
informed decisions about when or whether to have children presupposes two 
simultaneous conditions. On the one hand, the process of making decisions needs 
to develop in the absence of all forms of coercion. In other words, the decisions 
made by citizens should be carried out in a fully autonomous way and in 
correspondence to the reasons and needs determined by them. On the other, the 
state is responsible for assuring that all citizens have access to accurate and 
relevant information on reproduction, such that their decisions are made with full 
knowledge of the current alternatives to regulate fertility and to protect 
pregnancies. Reproductive rights are envisioned on the basis of a network of 
assumptions that precede them, and at the same time explain their legal discourse. 
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In an effort to clarify the assumptions that exist behind the international 
definition of reproductive rights, and to advance in their discussion I would like to 
propose a reading from a normative perspective. The objective is twofold. First, it 
allows to open the discussion about the content of reproductive rights by making 
their justification and explanation explicit, and enables an evaluation of their 
discursive legitimacy. That is to say, it allows for an analytical scrutiny of some 
of their underpinnings, the uncovering of veiled elements, and an opportunity to 
thematize the taken-for-granted reasoning behind them. Second, once we have 
defined the normative parameters it is not only possible to establish goals to 
pursue, but in addition to use normative agreements as an organized way to 
evaluate current practices, and to discover the impediments for the realization of 
the desired norm. 
2.4.2 Ideal Process for Making Reproductive Decisions  
Following a Habermasian approach, I propose the reconstruction of a 
normative framework for reproductive rights as an ideal decision-making process, 
where the end product is a decision about reproduction able to fulfill all the  
conceptual and procedural requirements that would be demanded by the current 
international definition of reproductive rights. 
The ideal decision-making process takes place in the private dimension of 
the social life as much as it does in the public dimension (see Chart 3). In each 
one of these dimensions differentiated dynamics are generated that contribute in 
different moments of the process to produce general, as well as particular 
resolutions. The process begins in the private sphere, it moves toward the public 
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domain and returns back to the private where resolutions are taken (although 
always transitory and potentially modifiable) in specific moments of the life 
course. 
It is in the dimension of the private that couples face their need of 
regulating or not their fertility, of becoming or not pregnant, of interrupting or not 
a pregnancy, of having or not a child. Couples develop their decision-making 
processes in their private worlds, through communicative interactions between 
them and with other people that are significant for their social and affective life 
and that are able to become emotional, moral, and cultural interlocutors. Through 
these interactions, couples discover, develop, and make explicit their desires, 
expectations, interests, and plans. This group of representations will constitute a 
constant source of meaning and the symbolic material from which couples can 
elaborate their reproductive decisions, and compare them against other social 
representations and decisions made by others: family members, friends, 
acquaintances or other people with whom they interact. 
The elements and criteria used for the elaboration of the decisions should 
be chosen and determined autonomously by each couple. If these elements and 
criteria come from history, tradition, science, or magic and if they are affective, 
moral, rational, religious, or economic depends ultimately on the needs and 
preferences of the couple. 
To the extent that all decisions are potentially exposed to reconsideration 
and evaluations, these should always be appreciated as transitory and modifiable. 
For example, through communicative interactions the couple can discover new 
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elements, standards, or ideas that modify their position or perspective in relation 
to certain reproductive decisions. Likewise, the discovery of new information and 
alternatives can constitute important ground that can lead to evaluations of past 
positions and perhaps partial or total reconsideration. 
In this dimension and in regard to the dynamics of the private, the freedom 
to make a reproductive decision is fundamentally determined by the exercise of 
individual and couple autonomy. Within the couple, free and equal individuals 
engage in explorations and conversations that are fair and respectful of each 
other's needs. These conditions are extended to other private contexts to sustain 
the autonomy of the couple so that we can assure that the communicative 
interactions, with other significant interlocutors, are developed in the absence of 
impositions or coercion. 
Once a reproductive decision is elaborated in the private domain, the 
couple meets with the logic and nature of social relations, in the public sphere, 
when they require and look for the provision of professional and specialized 
services. The type of service that is required depends on the type of decision that 
the couple has taken. 
Public institutions (governmental or not) should provide three different 
types of services: 1) information that is both general, and specific, as well as 
professional and specialized; 2) advice that is comprehensive and particular, and 
recommendations that are supported by professional and specialized knowledge, 
and 3) the most appropriate, current, and safe means that allow the couple to carry 
out their decisions. The provision of these services should not only be of the best 
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possible quality, but they should be offered with an unrestrained recognition and 
respect for the couple's autonomy and their decisions. 
The participation of institutions in the process of reproductive decisions 
should be, fundamentally, to facilitate the realizations of the desires, needs, and 
determinations of the couple. It is neither the function nor the charge of 
institutions to intervene in the determination of the judgments, criteria or elements 
of a decision and, much less, to determine the type or content of the decision for 
the couple. Institutions should assure that the couple has elaborated their decision 
aware of all relevant information and in light of professional recommendations 
that are impartial, of quality, and current. Additionally, they should offer the 
necessary means so that, once the decision is taken, couples can carry it out under 
the best and most healthy conditions. 
The meeting between couples with demands and providers of services take 
place within the realm of specific institutions that are regulated by national 
legislation, as well as by administrative norms and internal regulations. Even 
when institutions work according to the law and with arrangement to regulations, 
they hold a certain degree of autonomy that allows them to define the 
characteristics of the services they want to offer. Furthermore, this relative 
autonomy allows them to determine the basic profile of their internal 
organization, dynamics, and the structure within which social relations are 
established. It is in this sense that the freedom to make decisions requires not only 
of the protection from legal discourse, apparent in laws, but also from institutional 
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norms that guide the action of the providers of services, and that regulate the 
relationship with citizens that require of their services. 
On the basis of the previous arguments we can conclude that the full 
exercise of reproductive rights is assured through two basic conditions: freedom 
and access.  
Decisions can be elaborated freely if the process of decision-making is 
developed with absolute autonomy and in the absence of all forms of coercion. 
This has a different significance for the private dimension than for the public 
realm. In the private sphere freedom begins with self-determination and the 
control of one's own body. This principle is extended to the relationship of the 
couple (regardless of its daily, sexual, affective, legal or social arrangement), but 
it requires to be paired with the equality of rights and responsibilities in the 
decision-making process, in its realization, and in its consequences. Also, the 
presence of significant others in making decisions need to be carried out through 
free and respectful exchanges, and never as the imposition of approaches, 
perspectives, and interpretations that disregard the needs and desires of the 
couple. In the public realm, freedom is carried out from the private when the 
couple obtains an institutional service that is complete, of quality, and respectful 
of the autonomy of their decision. 
The condition of access also has different meanings depending on the 
dimension in which the decision-making process is occurring. In the private, it 
begins with a positive perception of the right to have access to the provision of 
services, and it extends to the possibility of obtaining relevant and necessary 
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information throughout the process, and in the different moments of the life 
course of individuals and couples. In the public, access also refers to information, 
that is professional and specialized, and that can aid the couple in the evaluation 
of alternatives and in the elaboration of their decisions. Additionally, institutions 
represent the access to the most appropriate, current, and safe means for the 
realization of the decisions made with regard to fertility and reproduction. Both in 
the private as in the public sphere it is crucial that access be universal, 
unrestricted, and equal for all citizens.  
2.4.3 Disturbances in the Ideal Process for Making Reproductive Decisions  
Once we have established the general structure of the normative ideal of 
the process of making reproductive decisions, now we can identify and analyze, in 
a very general way, the type of disturbances that the process suffers or to which it 
can be exposed or subjected (see Chart 4). 
By disturbances I am referring to all those social, political, and economic 
conditions that interfere or can potentially interfere in the development of an ideal 
process of decision-making. Therefore, these disturbances represent serious 
obstacles for the full exercise of the reproductive rights of citizens in specific 
national contexts.  
The sources of these interferences are basically two: power relations and 
systems of social differentiation that produce social inequality. The concept of 
power is understood here in its negative sense, that is to say, as domination. That 
is, power relations are conceptualized as relations of domination, where the will 
of some is imposed on others. In turn, I use systems of social differentiation when 
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referring to a network of perceptions and interpretations that make differences 
significant, and that generate and legitimate multiple social actions based on those 
forms of explaining and interpreting differences. These are forms that are 
prevalent and pervasive in societies, and that have a certain historical stability. 
However, not all forms of social differentiation become forms of social 
inequality. Together social inequality and relations of domination, produce the 
fundamental disturbances in the ideal process of making decisions, and constitute 
the central obstacles for the full exercise of reproductive rights.  
These disturbances occur both in the private and public sphere, although 
the specific ways in which they interfere and affect decisions will vary according 
to the dimension and to the social interactions through which they manifest their 
destructive force. 
For the part of the process that occurs in the private sphere, the 
interferences have two origins. One can be located in the logic and the dynamics 
of personal relationships, and the other linked to the class position and the place 
occupied within the structure of opportunities.  
For personal and intimate relationships, gender and generational 
domination (and perhaps other forms as well) are constant threats for developing 
decisions based on communicative interactions between equals. The imposition of 
perspectives, needs, and desires of one individual over the other transform 
decisions into unilateral outcomes that fracture the right to decide about one's own 
body, and relativize the free determination about one's own fertility and 
reproduction. In the world of intimacy, the self-determination over one's own 
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body and the freedom to decide over one's own reproduction can only be fully 
exercised when there is absolute respect for the other, intersubjective 
understanding, and communicative interactions that are free and equal. 
We have basically the same problem when the couple or their individuals 
share their desires, needs, and plans with friends and members of their nuclear 
and extensive families. If the communicative exchanges become instruments of 
domination and vehicles for the imposition of other's will by means of gender, 
generation, or kinship relationships the self-determination over the body and the 
freedom to make reproductive decisions disappears in a complex net of 
manipulation and subjection. In this way communities ratify and reproduce their 
membership through bonds of domination and subordination, instead of becoming 
enriching resources for the affective and symbolic world, and for the construction 
of individual identity, at the time that they consolidate a sense of belonging.  
Class position and the structure of opportunities have a disturbance effect 
in the private sphere because it interferes with access to information and the 
capacity to manage it. The most obvious and direct relationship is linked to 
schooling and formal education: the higher the education, the more exposure the 
individual will have to complete, truthful, current, and relevant information. But 
other associations might be underlying, perhaps connected with the formation of 
analytic and critical judgment, with the capacity to discern and discriminate, as 
well as with the possibilities of constructing autonomous and independent 
positions. 
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As for the part of the process that is developed in the public realm, the 
interference’s have two origins. One can be found in the logic and dynamics of 
medical and bureaucratic relations and, the other in the system of classes and 
structure of opportunities. To the extent that the provision of services happens, 
generally, in medical institutions, the relations that are established between 
citizens and providers are constantly exposed to different kinds of systems of 
power. The doctor-patient relation transforms reproductive knowledge into a 
specialized and professional knowledge that is concentrated in the social figure of 
physicians and medical personnel. It also transforms individuals that require a 
service into ignorant patients that depend on medical knowledge and their will to 
provide. This distribution of knowledge structures the relation in a hierarchical 
and vertical fashion, granting physicians and medical personnel a great deal of 
discretional power and influence over the reproductive decisions of individuals 
and couples.  
In turn, the structure and organization of institutions, the internal logic of 
their administrative systems and their specific forms of exercising power, the 
vertical flow of information and control, as well as their authoritarian practices 
and forms of distributing privileges are all brought to the forefront when citizens 
are forced to deal with the bureaucrats that represent those institutions. The 
content of the relation that the institutional employee offers to the citizen depends 
on how the institution defines its functions of service provision, perceive their 
responsibility towards citizens, and interpret their obligations in the provision of 
that service. To the extent that bureaucratic and medical institutions are 
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intertwined in an administrative complex the supply of services, the doctor-patient 
and bureaucrat-citizen relation appear linked and interwoven in their practices. 
The disturbances produced by the exercise of medical and bureaucratic 
power take place in combination and through other forms of social domination. In 
this way, systems of inequality and of social discrimination based on social class, 
race/ethnicity, sex, and age become vehicles of the exercise of medical and 
bureaucratic power or additional systemic forms to distribute attention, respect, 
services, and resources in a systematic, differential, and unequal way. 
The social class system and the structure of opportunities of a given 
society, in a specific period of its history, has profound effects over access to 
services. It not only determines the chances of having access, but also the 
characteristics and the quality of the services offered by the non-governmental 
(private sector), of course, but also over those offered by governmental 
institutions.  
The patterns of concentration and distribution of material and social 
wealth generate favorable conditions of access for certain sectors of the 
population, while restricting or precluding access for others. It is in this sense that 
the amount and qua lity of alternatives, on the basis of which reproductive 
decisions are made, depend on the amount of social and material resources that 
individuals and couples are capable of mobilizing during decision-making 
processes throughout their life course. 
This complex of power relations and systems of social inequality 
constantly threat the two central conditions for the exercise of reproductive rights 
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in the public domain: freedom and access. On the one hand, the universal 
entitlement of obtaining services is seriously disabled. Nation states fall short 
from their obligation to provide basic services to its entire population, and not all 
citizens have the possibility of obtaining them or of benefiting from the same 
service quality. On the other, the singular characteristic of the right to self-
determination and freedom is deeply questioned. Institutions abandon their charge 
to protect and encourage individuals and couples to develop free and autonomous 
reproductive decisions, and instead allow for the imposition of criteria that is 
guided by the logic of the exercise of specific powers and the intrusion of 
institutional programs and policies, that may or not coincide with the needs and 
desires of citizens. 
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Chapter 3:  Population Policies, Fertility Control, and 
Reproductive Rights in Mexico 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: A LOOK FROM THE BOTTOM UP 
Since the late sixties and early seventies, two events have had a 
particularly solid impact on the population dynamics of Mexico. First, a radical 
shift in the state's perception of the role of population growth in national 
development resulted in a policy aimed at controlling growth rather than 
encouraging it. Second, a steep decline in the general fertility rates, along with a 
significant increase in the prevalence of contraception, have reduced the overall 
levels of population growth. 
Regarding the association between fertility and contraception, various 
studies have been able to describe their evolution, levels, and tendencies, but have 
advanced very little in the realm of their socio logical and cultural explanation. In 
turn, the majority of the literature on population policy has consisted of 
historiographic accounts that focus on the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
certain programs, neglecting the social and political consequences that these 
programs have had in Mexico. In contrast, other research has attempted the study 
of population policy through the analysis of power relations, of the medicalization 
and institutionalization of reproduction, and from a rights of citizens perspective. 
The analysis presented in this chapter is informed by the following 
analytical ideas. The study of population policy (from design to enforcement) can 
take a top-down or a bottom-up viewpoint. These are analytically and politically 
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contrasting positions that have radically different consequences over the entire 
research process, the formulation of questions, and the processes of interpretation. 
Furthermore, this analysis calls for a perspective that is centered on the 
critique of power relations (Honne th, 1991; Kelly, 1994; Lukes, 1986; 
Wartenberg, 1992), that looks at political decision-making processes from the 
view, needs, and demands of civil society and citizens' rights, rather than from the 
instrumental and administrative needs of the state and governments. This implies 
a transformation of the reading of demographic phenomena and its interpretation 
in crucial ways, as well as a change in the processes of cognitive justification for 
sociological inquiry. 
In effect, the justification for the study of population policies stops being 
the evaluation of programmatic achievements or the degree to which population 
growth targets have been reached. It stops being the comparison between 
population projections, institutional goals, and demographic rates. It stops being 
the search for problems in the design and execution of governmental programs, as 
well as the reasons why certain population groups appear to be "unresponsive" to 
institutional incentives and governmental campaigns to initiate contraception or 
further control their fertility. The analytical entrance can no longer be justified 
exclusively by a particular reading of the relation between population growth and 
development or the political needs of the state. In contrast, the approach I support 
in this chapter inquires about the needs of citizens, and the possibilities they have 
of exercising their reproductive rights, as well as the examination of the social 
conditions under which this takes place. 
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As an application of the framework developed in chapter two, this chapter 
carries out a reading of the connection between population policies, fertility 
regulation, and the constitutional endowment of reproductive rights in Mexico as 
a complex and conflicting social and political relationship that confronts state 
rationality with the rights of citizens over reproduction and its fundamental 
decisions.  
The chapter is divided in two major sections. In the first section, I present 
a general review of population policies and their relation to the contemporary 
dynamics of fertility and contraception in Mexico, as well as the research and 
explanations  developed in this regard. In the second section, I describe the 
process by which controlling fertility became the center of population policy 
efforts. I propose interpreting the institutionalization and medicalization of 
reproduction as a social process that explains how reproductive decisions were 
moved from the private to the public domain. Finally, an analysis of family 
planning services and contraception, will allow for an evaluation of the exercise 
of reproductive rights within the context of governmental medical institutions in 
contemporary Mexico. 
3.2 POPULATION POLICIES: FROM STIMULATION TO CONTROL 
3.2.1 Policies, Fertility, and Contraception 
On the basis of the paradigm that claims that the strength of a government 
and a nation rests on its population, in 1936 the first national population policy 
was approved and its central conception can be understood as clearly pronatalistic 
(México, 1938; Cabrera, 1989). Following the substantial drop in the general and 
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specific mortality rates between the third and fourth decade of this century, 
fertility became the variable that in great measure explains the rapid population 
growth experienced by Mexico (Alba, 1982; Mier y Terán, 1991; Sandoval, 
1988). Since that time, the evolution of fertility was characterized by high and 
increasing levels that were sustained throughout a 30 year period. In fact, around 
the years of 1966 and 1967 the country had the highest levels of fertility in its 
history (Juárez, et al., 1989; Juárez, and Quilodrán, 1990; Welti, 1997). 
At the beginning of the seventies the pronatalistic conception was 
abandoned. A major political and legislative change moved population policy 
from a stimulating to a controlling position. In correspondence, the primary 
objective of the 1974 General Law of Population (still in effect today) is to 
"regulate all phenomena that affect population in regard to its volume, structure, 
dynamics and distribution in the national territory, with the purpose of achieving a 
just and equitable participation of the benefits of social and economic 
development" (Mexico, 1974, Article 1).  
With the approval of the General Law, the state embraced a neo-
Malthusian stance that now perceived population growth as a major obstacle for 
economic and social development. Being the reduction of population growth the 
central change that is pursued, the regulation of fertility is conceived and 
constructed as the fundamental tool for reaching this purpose. This is why, in 
1976 and at a national level, the promotion of contraception became one of the 
most important policy goals and family planning programs the center of 
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population policy-making and enforcement (Aparicio, 1988; Cervantes, 1989 and 
1990; De Barbieri, 1985; Llera, 1991; Warwick, 1982). 
With the full support of the Legislative branch of government, then 
President Luis Echeverría put forward initiatives for changing articles of the 
constitution and introduced the General Law of Population. The new law not only 
explained the state's change in conception, but in addition it created the 
institutional mechanisms for specific policies to be designed and executed 
following the spirit of the legal changes. 
Although it is true that these paradigmatic changes in population policies 
were not forced by the cumulative influence and pressure of organized social 
movements and of political interest groups (like it happened in other countries in 
Latin America and around the globe, Dixon-Mueller and Germain, 1994), the 
legal initiatives, the creation of family planning public services, and the 
widespread availability of contraception was met with the endorsement of 
numerous social groups and the approval of large sectors of Mexico's population. 
Indeed, there were only a few socially organized groups that openly 
questioned these policy changes and confronted them in public. Claiming a 
betrayal of catholic moral principles the top hierarchy of the Mexican church and 
its non-ordained "civil" organization, the Opus Dei, confronted the legal changes 
publicly, and were particularly troubled by family planning services and the 
access to contraception. Despite their relative cultural power and their political 
influence, these retrograde forces, however, were unable to reverse the course of 
the governmental initiatives or to interfere with the establishment of family 
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planning as a public service (Warwick, 1982). However, this confrontational 
position did not last long, giving way to a silent tolerance towards the 
contraceptive practices of its followers (Cabrera, 1994; Márquez, 1984). 
By contrast, a very broad spectrum of organized social and political 
groups, manifested their unfettered support for the legal changes and the 
institutional initiatives. Women's and feminist organiza tions, demographers and 
social scientists, primary health physicians and health providers, as well as 
academic institutions, private non-profit organizations and professional 
associations evaluated the changes as an undeniable progressive move. But the 
interpretations and reasons for backing the presidential initiatives were far from 
homogenous and reflected a very diverse political landscape (Cabrera, 1994; 
Tuirán, 1988). While some groups interpreted the changes in policy as a sign of 
the modernization of Mexico, others saw them with sympathy but were doubtful 
of the possibilities of their realization given the political tradition of big promises 
and ineffectual bureaucratic follow up. Nevertheless, one way or the other the 
positions were very diverse, but the support was pervasive (Márquez, 1984; 
Warwick, 1982).  
Additionally, the steep increase and the extensive use of  contraception, 
particularly among urban, middle class women with above average education, 
during the first years of birth-control legality point out the level of receptivity that 
the policy changes had in specific sectors of the population (Table 1 & 2). The 
initiation of governmental family planning programs matched up with many 
sectors that were already contracepting (in some cases covertly), and with others 
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that were ready but were unable to find the institutional or medical support to do 
so (Juárez, and Quilodrán, 1990). Whether one interprets this as "unmet need" for 
contraception (Bongaarts, 1991) or not, the importance for the political process is 
that it represented an additional source (albeit non-organized) of extensive support 
to the policy changes that were being enacted. 
In 1973, the year the General Law of Population was approved and selling 
contraceptives was no longer illegal, slightly less than 12% of married women of 
childbearing ages (15 to 45 years) used modern contraceptive methods. By 1976 
and 1982 the percentage of use of any method (traditional and modern) rose to 
30.2 and 47.7%, respectively. In 1987 the observed figure was 52.7% (Table 1, 
Graph 1). Towards the end of the eighties, and after the first decade of the 
National Family Planning Program more than half of all married women of 
childbearing ages were using contraception to regulate their fertility and avoid 
pregnancies (Aparicio, 1988a; CONAPO, 1995; Figueroa, et al. 1988; Palma, et 
al., 1990). 
In the next decade, from 1987 to 1997, contraceptive prevalence continued 
to experience an important increase. By 1992 it had expanded to 63.1%, and from 
there to 66.5% in 1995, and to 68.5% in 1997 (Table 1, Graph 1). That is, by the 
end of the nineties seven out of every ten married women were contraceptors in 
Mexico. In a period of twenty five years contraception went from being a rare 
event practiced by the few to being pervasively and extensively used by the 
majority (CONAPO, 1995 and 1999; Palma, et al., 1990). 
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The increasing trend of contraceptive prevalence in Mexico was, however, 
not homogeneously experienced. While the differences by age and number of 
children (parity) are significant and point to patterns that concentrate the increase 
in some groups more than in others, place of residence (rural/urban) and formal 
education are the indicators that more sharply differentiate the contraceptive 
experience of women in the last quarter of the 20th century. 
The highest levels of contraceptive prevalence, throughout the period, 
have been concentrated in the central groups of childbearing ages (25 to 39 years), 
and towards the latter years it has also included the 40 to 44 years of age group. 
While the prevalence of the two youngest (15-19 and 20-24) and the oldest age 
groups (45-49) have been comparatively low, it is clear that all groups have 
experience a steady and rapid increase (Table 1, Graph 2).  
The age pattern has its correlative in the prevalence by parity, to the extent 
that the lowest contraceptive use is located in the groups of women with the 
lowest parity (one or no children), and in the group with the highest (four or more 
children) (Table 1, Graph 3). 
While the contraceptive prevalence by age and parity are reflecting a 
certain fertility schedule and certain patterns of reproductive decisions, for 
example to decide in favor of contraception only after having 1 or 2 children, the 
differentials by place of residence and formal education are indicators of 
processes linked to social inequality and the unequal distribution of wealth in 
Mexico. 
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A rural place of residence is defined as a locality with a population of less 
than 2,500. Overwhelmingly, these are relatively isolated from basic services, 
have a low integration to labor and commodity markets, and concentrate the 
largest amount of the population in Mexico living in poverty. From 1976 to 1997, 
the differences between the prevalence in rural and urban Mexico have remained 
very high. Although the gap has been closing (from 28 to 20 percentage points), 
the use of contraception in rural sites has a lag of 10 years, relatively constant 
throughout the period, when compared to urban sites (Table 1, Graph 4). Lack of 
access to family planning services certainly plays an important part in this, but 
other direct and secondary effects of social inequality are also responsible, such as 
the level of formal education. 
The strong relation between formal education and contraceptive 
prevalence is present from 1976 to 1997, and maintains the same pattern of 
differences. Every level of schooling makes an important difference, but the great 
divide is the completion of elementary school. Women with elementary school or 
more have significantly higher levels of contraceptive use than those with less or 
no schooling at all (Table 1, Graph 5). 
Given the changes that took place in the dynamics of contraception, one 
would expect as well important changes to follow in the levels and patterns of 
fertility, during the same time period. In effect, from the peak years of the sixties 
the total fertility rates6 have continuously decreased. In a first phase, the rates 
decreased very sharply from the levels reached in the mid-sixties were the average 
                                                 
     6 Indicates the average number of children that women of childbearing age (from 15 to 49 
years) would have at the end of their reproductive life, with the observed levels of procreation by 
age. 
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number of children was as high as 7.1 per women of childbearing age to 4.3 for 
the year of 1980 (Table 3, Graph 6). This decline is quite remarkable if one 
considers that it happened only in the span of a decade and a half. At the 
beginning of the eighties women in Mexico were having on average three children 
less than what their counterparts were having fifteen years earlier (Juárez, et al., 
1989; Juárez, and Quilodrán, 1990; Welti, 1997; Zavala, 1989). 
The total fertility rates reached in the sixties were in fact the highest 
fertility experienced in Mexico's contemporary history and indicate the state of 
reproduction prior to the changes in population policy. In turn, the decline that 
was experienced in the years to follow the national family planning programs are 
an indication, as well, of the state of reproductive decisions during this period. 
The new access and public availability to contraception was well received by 
large sectors of the population, and contraceptive practices became widespread in 
a very short period of time. A considerable number of women and their partners 
were not only ready to regulate their reproduction, but seemed to be also ready to 
stop their reproduction at levels that were considered a decade earlier to be only at 
half way through a "reproductive career" (so to speak). In other words, the legal 
changes that allowed the approval of the General Law of Population and the 
charge given to medical institutions to carry out a comprehensive and national 
family planning program all happened within a social context that was in tuned or 
perhaps even requiring of these policy changes and the supply of those 
contraceptive services. 
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A second and quite different phase, however, was experienced throughout 
the eighties and on into the nineties. While the total fertility rate continued with a 
declining dynamics, this occurred at a much slower pace than the one observed 
for the seventies and early eighties. In effect, for roughly the same number of 
years the fertility levels decreased in less than half of what was observed for the 
previous phase of decline. In 1980, women of childbearing ages were having on 
average 4.3 children. This level of fertility went down to 3.9, five years later 
(1985), to a 3.2 level for 1990, and an estimation of 2.9 for the mid-nineties 
(1995) (Table 3, Graph 6) (CONAPO, 1995 and 1999; Figueroa, 1992; Paz, 1995; 
Welti, 1997). There is no doubt that the decline in the fertility levels was still very 
important for this period, but it is also notable the considerable slowing of the 
pace. In the mid-nineties women of childbearing ages were having 1.4 less 
children than their correlatives at the beginning of the eighties. 
The high levels of fertility throughout the decades of the sixties and 
seventies meant that women were within the cycle of procreation for very long 
periods of their reproductive life. In terms of the patterns of fertility by age what 
can be observed since 1974 is an early schedule with the majority of births 
occurring between the ages of 20 and 34, and a very high concentration between 
20 and 29 years (Table 3, Graph 7). And while the general shape of the fertility by 
age has remained throughout the 30 year period, all age groups have experienced 
very important reductions in their levels, and childbirth has become an experience 
of younger women (average fertility age fell from 29.0 to 27.2, 1974-1996) (Table 
3, Graph 8). The most outstanding changes, however, are that there has been a 
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significant delay of the first birth (19.8 to 23.6 years, 1974-1999), and that the 
spacing between births has increased by as much as 1.5 years (4.1 to 5.7 years, 
1974-1999. Estimations from CONAPO, 1999). 
Fertility differentials follow a similar pattern of effects than the ones we 
observed for contraceptive prevalence. Both place of residence and formal 
education are also significant dividers of the experience of fertility in Mexico.  
Rural fertility has been consistently higher than urban fertility, yet the gap 
between them has narrowed from 2.8 in 1974 to 1.2 children in 1996. Still, rural 
fertility has recorded levels at different points throughout the period that are 
similar than those observed for urban fertility ten years before (Table 4, Graph 9).  
Similarly, the fertility differences produced by formal education are 
profound. The fertility levels of women with no formal education or incomplete 
elementary school have been consistently higher than the levels of women that 
completed elementary school or had achieved higher schooling. These differences 
are maintained throughout the period, despite the reduction that all of them 
experienced, for every year under observation. In fact, some of the differences are 
astounding. From 1974 to 1985, the fertility of women with no instruction or 
some elementary school was twice as high as that of women with junior high 
school or more. When comparing women with the highest instruction to those 
with no instruction, this huge gap actually remains for 1990 and 1996 (Table 5, 
Graph 10). 
In addition to those differentials, whether a woman participates or not in 
an economic activity creates two very contrasting reproductive experiences. 
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Women that actively participate in an economic activity have lower fertility rates 
than those that do not, and the differences range from 3 children in 1974 to 1.4 in 
1996 (Table 6, Graph 11). The pattern of these differences are maintained when 
introducing place of residence, but they are more pronounced for urban women 
than for rural (Table 7). 
Taken together and within a time frame of 25 to 30 years, the demographic 
transformations in Mexico have been quite notable: the level of fertility has been 
dramatically cut in more than half and the prevalence of general contraceptive use 
has more than doubled. All of these changes, of course, have occurred within the 
framework of an important legal change, an active population policy, that has 
been enacted through an aggressive family planning program, and whose 
implementation was normatively charged to governmental medical institutions 
(De Barbieri, 1982; Figueroa, 1991; Llera, 1991; Warwick, 1982). 
The dramatic increase in the use of birth-control methods and the 
associated reduction in the fertility rates observed in the first phase of these 
changes, was followed by a second phase in which the general and long term 
trends while sustained their pace was reduced considerably.  
In 1997 contraceptive prevalence reached the historic high of 68.5% 
among all married women in childbearing ages in Mexico. While this represents 
more than a doubling of the prevalence since the mid-seventies, from the 
estimated level for the sixties (in the area of 15 to 17%)7 it would actually 
constitute a five-fold gain. Most of the increase, however, happened before the 
                                                 
     7 Welti estimated a Mexico City prevalence of 25% for 1964 (1980), and García estimated a 
rural prevalence of 10.3% for 1969 (1976). 
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mid-eighties. In fact, 59% of the increase occurred between 1976 and 1987, and 
perhaps up to 69% between the mid-sixties and 1987 (if one considers the 
estimation for the sixties to be at a level of 17%)  
Likewise the total fertility rate experienced a similar behavior. In 1995, 
Mexico recorded the historic low total fertility rate of 2.9 children among all 
childbearing women. However, sixty seven percent of the total decline took place 
in the first fifteen years of the thirty year period between 1965 and 1995. 
(CONAPO, 1995; Palma, et al., 1990; Paz, 1995; Welti, 1997; Zavala, 1989).  
The behavior of these indicators in the second phase of this dynamics 
(from the eighties to the nineties) generated, not only different interpretations but 
a debate with opposing routes of explanation.  
From the governmental institutions these trends were interpreted as 
programmatic signs of the need to redouble efforts. Fertility control programs 
should be extended, coverage should be increased and unaccessible or marginal 
areas should be provided with the basic services of the national family planning 
program. States, regions, and groups of population were classified according to 
their levels of fertility and birth-control use, and those that fell under the 
classification of "traditional" (high fertility and low contraception) were defined 
as programmatic priorities (CONAPO, 1990 and 1991; López, 1989). 
From the non-governmental and academic side, the latest dynamics of 
fertility and contraceptive prevalence called for careful examinations and complex 
diagnoses, rather than a programmatic response. And although the questions that 
were raised could not be answered in the short term, they were suggested should 
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become routes of analysis, critical perspectives, and research projects. To what 
extent can we interpret these data as symptoms of a process of "disengagement" 
between the state and civil society? Could this be indicating a process of an 
"uncoupling" of the rationality of the Mexican state in regard to population 
policy, from the needs of citizens in general, and of women in particular with 
regard to their reproductive decisions? (Cervantes, 1990 and 1993). What type of 
social and cultural processes generated the changes? Are these behaviors going to 
generate new trends, patterns, and levels, and establish a new relation between 
fertility and contraception? (Figueroa, 1990; Figueroa, et al. 1988) To what extent 
are these indicating a reaction and response to aggressive family planning 
programs and fertility control policies? (Camarena, 1991; Lerner and Quesnel, 
1994). Over the past 30 years family planning programs have been enforced by 
medical bureaucracies and been guided by quantitative population growth goals. 
What kinds of effects have these quantitatively oriented programs had over the 
capacity to make decisions in regard to reproduction? (Cervantes, 1993; De 
Barbieri, 1990; Figueroa, 1992; Merrick, T., 1990; Tuirán, R., 1988). 
3.2.2 Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Perspective  
The evolution of the levels of fertility and contraceptive use in Mexico has 
been strongly documented through six surveys at the national level  (EMF 1976, 
ENPUA 1978 and 1979, END 1982, ENFES 1987, ENADID 1992, ENPF 1995, 
ENADID 1997)8. These surveys have been employed in research projects that 
                                                 
     8 EMF 1976: Encuesta Mexicana de Fecundidad (Mexican Fertility Survey, part of the World 
Fertility Surveys). ENPUA 1978 and 1979: Encuesta Nacional de Prevalencia en el Uso de 
Métodos Anticonceptivos (National Survey on the Prevalence and Use of Contraceptive Methods). 
END 1982: Encuesta Nacional Demográfica (National Demographic Survey). ENFES 1987: 
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have explored changes in the magnitude of the rates of fertility and contraceptive 
use throughout different time periods, as well as in relation to certain 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population. Because the 
vast majority of these studies have concentrated on the description of those 
changes, the explanation of the causal factors of reproductive behavior have been 
seriously limited. In spite of the advances in the analysis of the socioeconomic 
and demographic variables that exercise considerable influence over contraceptive 
usage and fertility, comparatively less has been done  regarding the sociocultural 
determinants of fertility and its regulation (Figueroa, J.G., 1988; Palma, Y. et al., 
1990). However, in spite of their relative scarcity some studies have made 
interesting contributions to the area, by exploring the world of perceptions and 
cultural constructions, an their role within reproduction (Figueroa, 1990b; Shedlin 
and Hollerbach, 1981) or by examining the relationship between social 
institutions and reproduction (Camarena, 1991; Lerner and Quesnel 1992 and 
1994).  
The study of the design, implementation and decision-making processes of 
Mexico's population policies is clearly less advanced and has had an unequal 
development. Since the approval of the General Law of Population in 1974 until 
the mid-eighties, the field was basically developed, and largely controlled by 
governmental institutions such as National Population Council, the Ministry of 
Health and the Mexican Institute of Social Security. When looking at the past, 
                                                                                                                                     
Encuesta Nacional sobre Fecundidad y Salud (National Survey on Fertility and Health, art of the 
Demographic and Health Surveys). ENADID 1992: Encuesta Nacional de Indicadores 
Demográficos (National Survey on Demographic Indicators), ENPF 1995: Encuesta Nacional de 
Planificación Familiar (National Survey of Family Planning), ENADID 1997: Encuesta Nacional 
de Indicadores Demográficos (National Survey on Demographic Indicators). 
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they reconstruct the evolution of the state's population thought since the Mexican 
Revolution, as a coherent, logical, and undisturbed process. When focusing on the 
present, the descriptions of governmental programs, and actions are aimed at 
celebrating and applauding the institutional efforts of the state9, rather than 
striving to produce analytical and critical explanations of the social and political 
processes involved. In contrast, towards the mid-eighties a series of studies 
emerge suggesting and creating alternative perspectives to the one espoused by 
the official voice of governmental institutions. With a different approach and 
developing a critical analysis of the demographic rationality of the state and the 
processes of implementation of fertility control policies, these new studies 
develop a reading of the political dynamics involved in population policy-making 
from the perspective of the social conditions and rights of citizens, and the 
responsibilities of the state to protect these rights and allow for their unrestricted 
exercise (Bronfman, et al., 1986; Cervantes, 1990 and 1993; De Barbieri, 1982, 
1985 and 1990; Figueroa, 1991b, 1992b, 1994a and 1995a; Figueroa, et al., 1994; 
Márquez, 1984; Merrick, 1990; Tuirán, 1988; Warwick, 1982).  
Using the theories of modernization and of demographic transition as 
analytical frameworks, a group of studies have interpreted the process that 
Mexico experienced during the last three decades of the 20th century, as a 
transition from a traditional demographic regime of natural fertility to a modern 
regime of controlled fertility (Alba, and Potter, 1986; Juárez, et al., 1989; Juárez, 
and Quilodrán, 1990; Mier y Terán, and Rabell, 1990; Zavala, 1989). Others, have 
                                                 
     9 Good examples of these are: Martínez, J., 1985; Sandoval, A., 1988. Of course, the 
historiographic documents produced by the National Population Council, are also good 
illustrations: Consejo Nacional de Población 1975, 1978, 1985, 1990, and 1991. 
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proposed conceptualizing the changes in reproductive behavior as a direct 
response and a result of a well designed and efficiently orchestrated population 
policy. They argue that the achievement of policy goals has occurred only 
because the state has met and fulfilled societal needs for regulating fertility, 
through the establishment of a national family planning program and the 
provision of contraceptive methods and services (CEDDU, 1970; Cabrera, 1989, 
1990, and 1994; Martínez, 1985; Sandoval, 1988; Urbina, et al., 1984; Zavala, 
1990). Yet others, argue that the data that is produced and available constitutes a 
major obstacle for the exploration and analysis of the social forces involved in the 
recent reproductive changes experienced by diverse sectors of Mexico's 
population. They called for the production of data that is sensitive to processes 
that lay behind demographic indicators in the realm of cultural, economic, and 
social relations (Bronfman, et al. 1986; Figueroa, et al., 1988; Palma, et al., 1990). 
Also, these and other authors have pointed out the need for in-depth studies that 
engage the social and cultural dimensions of reproductive decisions, and that 
explore the function and effects of social inequality, power relations, and the 
institutional mediation between population policies and reproductive behavior 
(Cervantes, 1993; De Barbieri, 1990; Figueroa, 1991b, 1992a, and 1992b; 
Merrick, 1990; Tuirán, 1988; Warwick, 1990). 
Finally, throughout the nineties there has been a proliferation of works that 
have called for a systematic critique of population policies, through an analysis of 
social inequality, from a gender perspective, and using a reproductive rights 
approach. Worried about a long tradition of institutional authoritarianism, the 
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authors have argued for an assertion of citizenship rights and the opening of 
processes of democratization in diverse spheres of social life in contemporary 
Mexico (Aparicio, 1988b, 1993; Azzolini, 1993; Cervantes, 1993, 1995a, 1995b 
and 1996; De Barbieri, 1990, 1994, and 1999; Figueroa, 1992, 1995 and 1999; 
Figueroa, et al., 1994; Lamas, 1993, 1994, and 1995; Murieda, and Hernández, 
1994; Ortiz, 1994, 1998, and 1999). 
3.3 INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND M EDICALIZATION OF REPRODUCTIVE 
DECISIONS 
3.3.1 Fertility Control as the Center of Population Policies  
When population growth was defined as a primary obstacle for social and 
economic development, and in this sense as an impediment for the fulfillment of 
the so-called "national project", the modern political paradigm defined, at the 
same time, the general orientation of population policy and the center around 
which the enforcement of governmental programs would revolve (Cervantes, 
1990). In fact, in order to halt and reverse the population increase trend, and in 
light of the important decline of the overall mortality levels, the reduction of birth 
rates, through a modification of reproductive patterns, was seen as the most viable 
alternative. 
Through a series of transformations, population policy in Mexico acquired 
its basic content, its programmatic profile, and its enforcement strategy. First, all 
fundamental concerns were reduced to only one component: fertility levels. 
Second, to the extent that modern contraception was conceived as the most 
efficient mechanism for the control of fertility, the programmatic axis was 
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transferred to the governmental sector in charge of administrating public health 
services. Third, when the promotion and diffusion of contraceptive methods was 
defined as the main policy action of family planning programs, medical 
bureaucracies were given a very active role in determining the success of national 
demographic plans. Thus, in one political process Mexico's population policy 
experienced a demographic reductionism, a medicalization of programs and 
actions, and consequently, reproductive decisions became institutionalized. 
To the extent that decisions concerning procreation were converted in 
targets of institutional activities, and their outcome, in terms of children ever 
born, was used as a criterion to evaluate the impact of family planning programs, 
all decisions concerning reproduction and family size were no longer seen as 
private affairs, or decisions to be made in the realm of privacy (Tuirán, R., 1988). 
The programmatic task of modifying reproductive cultural norms and 
practices that stimulated high fertility rates began by attracting women to medical 
institutions using a discourse that argued the existence of an inevitable 
relationship between reproductive behavior and medical knowledge, and that 
reduced women to users or potential users of contraception. Reproductive 
intentions of having two or seven children, the postponement of pregnancies or 
the definitive limitation of fertility, and all actions and decisions regarding 
reproduction could not continue taking place within the exclusive limits of the 
family, they had to be uprooted and transferred to those social spaces were 
medicine was the hegemonic reason and practice, in order to subject them to 
intervention, to reorientation, to redefinition. At the same time that reproductive 
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decisions were dislodged from the private terrain, familial and domestic 
knowledge were de- legitimized, subsumed by the domain of medical knowledge 
and its paradigms. Specific governmental institutions were made programmatic 
instruments of the nation's demographic will and the interpretation of the nation's 
demographic needs were conferred upon medical bureaucracies. 
With the centralization of population policy around the control of fertility, 
the programmatic efforts for reaching population growth targets became the 
responsibility of governmental health institutions (Figueroa, 1991a). The tasks of 
translating the political paradigms of the state concerning population control, and 
of convincing the society that their reproductive needs had to be in full 
correspondence with the government's demographic goals, and with their policies 
and programs, were given to health professionals in general, but in particular 
these responsibilities were given to the physicians that worked for governmental 
institutions. This is how the reproductive decision making process was 
medicalized and the exercise of reproductive rights became institutionalized in 
Mexico (Tuirán, 1988). 
3.3.2 Medical Institutions and Reproductive Rights 
In the 21 year period between 1976 and 1997, contraceptive prevalence 
among married women of childbearing ages had a spectacular increase. In effect, 
while the use of all methods more than doubled (from 30.2% to 68.5%), the 
exclusive use of modern methods almost tripled (from 23.1% to 59.2%) (Table 1). 
The steep increase in contraceptive prevalence was certainly not 
homogeneous across type of method. In fact, the pattern of usage by method 
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presented important variations throughout the period. The year the National 
Family Planning Program was set in motion, the most popular method was clearly 
the pill, followed by traditional methods, IUD's, and female operation. Twenty 
years later this contraceptive mix had changed completely. In the late nineties, 
female operation had definitely become the most used method, followed by 
IUD's, traditional methods, and the pill (Table 8, Graph 12). 
While in 1976 the pill attracted 36% of the total use, by the end of the 
period, in 1997, it had become one of the least favored methods dropping to only 
10% Conversely, while female operation was in 1976 prevalent only among 9% 
of contraceptors, in two decades it increased dramatically to being only five 
percentage points away from half of all contraceptive use in Mexico (Table 8, 
Graph 12). 
A key provision of the General Law of Population was the establishment 
of the National Population Council (CONAPO), an interministerial coordinating 
body headed by the Secretary of Government (equivalent to a ministry of the 
interior), and directed by a General Secretary (Mexico, 1974). 
As an institution of the executive branch of government, the formal 
function of the Council is to design, organize, and evaluate the implementation of 
population policies, plans, and programs in the country. Since 1974, at the 
beginning of every new governmental period (every six years) it has been 
customary for the Council to formulate the National Population Program. This 
document has to be first approved by an interministerial council presided by the 
Secretary of Government and later endorsed by the President of Mexico in a 
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national meeting with all state governors. Formally, it represents the coordinated 
efforts of all relevant governmental agencies that are seen as necessary 
participants in the implementation of such policies (Mexico, 1974). 
In the specific case of fertility control policies and family planning 
programs, that have played such a central role for population policies at large, the 
main governmental agencies (aside from CONAPO) in charge of their design and 
implementation have been health institutions. Together, the Secretary of Health 
(SS: Secretaría de Salud) and the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS: 
Instituto Mexicano de Seguridad Social) have been the two major players in terms 
of policy making and service provision (CONAPO, 1995). 
It has been also customary, for the past 30 years, that the National 
Population Program include, in its general objectives, population growth goals to 
be achieved within certain time periods. These population growth goals are then 
translated into total fertility goals, which in turn serve as the basis for determining 
the amount of contraceptive prevalence that would be required for reaching such a 
level of fertility. The Interinstitutional Program of Family Planning is developed 
by the public medical institutions that provide these services in Mexico, and under 
the coordination of the Council. These, so called, intersectorial meetings are 
responsible for determining the national and regional contraceptive prevalence 
goals by institution and method, which in turn is converted into specific 
contraceptive goals to be achieved by each public medical institution (CONAPO, 
1975, 1978, 1985, 1990, 1991, and 1995). 
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Although there has never been an open, public, and explicit establishment 
of institutional contraceptive quotas in Mexico, the bureaucratic unfolding of 
quantitative population growth goals, and there subsequent translation into 
fertility, and national contraceptive prevalence levels generates, I contend, an 
implicit institutional quota system of general and specific prevalence by 
contraceptive method. 
Three years after the launching of the National Family Planning Program, 
public health institutions provided 51.1% of all modern methods being used in 
Mexico. By the year of 1997, governmental institutions covered almost three-
quarters (72.5%) of modern contraceptive coverage. This important growth in 
public service provision was conversely followed by a decline in the participation 
of private sources (from 48.9% to 27.5%) (Table 9, Graph 13).  
Of all public institutions, IMSS has been by far the most prominent 
provider of modern contraception, followed by the SS. In 1979, IMSS covered 
28% of all modern contraceptors and increased to 42% by 1997. By comparison 
the SS grew from 14% to 20%, during the same period. The general decline in the 
participation of the private sector, largely can be attributed to the decline in 
pharmacies as providers of modern methods (Table 9, Graph 14), and can be 
associated to the important decline in the use of the pill (Table 8, Graph 12). 
The fact that certain reproductive decisions have experienced a process of 
institutionalization, means that the exercise of the right to decide over the number 
of children to have and when to have them now depends, at least partially, on the 
logic, structure, procedures, and intentionality of governmental medical 
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institutions who have the legal charge to provide with family planning and 
reproductive health services, and thus become the contexts within which 
reproductive decisions might be actualized, planned or very frequently even 
elaborated. 
As bureaucratic institutions, these medical organizations that are 
responsible for managing the regulation of fertility and for delivering the fertility 
component of population growth targets, share certain characteristics with other 
institutions and have aspects that set them apart. 
Hierarchical discretionality and vertical functioning are two rationalities 
that inform the design, planning, and procedures that take place in these 
institutions. The way in which decisions that concern all are made, and that define 
the activities of the institution in general, happen from the top down. It is not only 
that the information flows vertically and that in the multiple steps involved its 
content is filtered and modified discretionally, but additionally that under the 
discursive title of efficiency activities and responsibilities are delegated down, 
and when the moment allows or demands blame is also transferred in that 
direction. In one complex yet constant movement, the top hierarchies keep 
crucial, damaging, or compromising information away from the rest of the 
members of the institution and find, open, or create mechanisms of displacing 
blame in the face of mistakes or institutional failures (Litrell, et al., 1983; 
Williams, et al., 1983). 
The reproduction of these institutions as bureaucratic entities rest on its 
normativity and on its administrative regulation. But the internal cohesion and the 
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control of its members requires of mechanisms of selective membership and 
forms of exclusion. In this way for example, there are no normative articles that 
explicitly formulate the way in which individuals, as civil servants or employees 
of a private institution, should associate with each other, behave to be considered 
a member of selective groups, or act to be perceived as committed and loyal 
workers to the institution and its political project. The forms are not apparent and 
open, the mechanisms are implicit and discursive; their vehicles are the dark and 
concealed word, and the spread of rumors and fragmented information (or dis-
information). Their operation works on the basis of moral dichotomies that 
differentiate and contrapose right from wrong, the appropriate from the 
inappropriate, and the politically sensitive from the politically cynical (Litrell, et 
al. 1983). With these non-explicit criteria behavior is constantly evaluated, 
positions are approved or disapproved, opinions are encouraged or discarded. The 
morality that circulates in the hallways, and works its way in and out of offices 
becomes a constant gaze that hangs over every member, and is  used as an 
instrument of behavior adjustment, control of deviance, soft coercion, and 
disciplinary persuasion. 
The administrative tradition in Mexico, over the past five decades, is that 
at the end of every presidential period (every six years) all top and mid level 
officials are rotated or substituted (Camp, 1999). In contrast, employees below 
that ranking remain in the same institution and in permanent positions that either 
they have obtained or been politically granted. It is also a tradition that high level 
administrators move from one institution to another seeking opportunities for the 
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advancement of their political or bureaucratic careers. In tune with a long 
tradition of clientilistic political relations, these "career moves" are granted or 
made possible in a reciprocal understanding of future obligations and 
compensations (Meyer, 1999). 
These administrative and political traditions are relevant to the extent that 
they bring about the lack of specialization of those individuals who actually make 
the central decisions in these institutions. The offices and positions that these top 
officials occupy are defined by the clientilistic political arrangements between 
different politically powerful groups, instead of by the professional qualification 
required for serving to the needs of specific communities or social groups in civil 
society. 
Euphemistically, in contemporary Mexico the distinction between top or 
mid- level officials and the rest of the employees is known formally as the 
difference between "personnel you can trust" (personal de confianza) and base 
workers (trabajadores de base). The implication being, that the more permanent 
workers cannot be trusted. 
As obvious as it might seem, it is necessary to say that these base workers, 
these salaried workers are key for the operation of the institution. They are, 
ultimately, the ones that make possible the realization of plans and programs, 
which carry out the actions of the institution. When the top hierarchy of these 
bureaucracies are concerned about reaching certain goals and objectives then 
these base workers are directly and recurrently invoked, but in the daily routines 
their participation becomes invisible, and the lack of recognition turns into the 
 135 
norm. Without them, no program could be realized, but in the every day life 
discourse of the institution they are treated as substitutable or irrelevant. This is 
possible because ultimately the specific and contextual power of the employees 
does not operate from the bottom up. Officially, this route does not exist. 
Employees are not recognized in their capacity to participate in the generation of 
programs or to have the knowledge to suggest modifications or re-orientations of 
those in place. Their specific and contextual power, instead, is exercised in the 
micro world of the provision of a service, and through the social relations they 
establish with the public (clients, patients, patrons) (Foucault, 1980; Litrell et al., 
1983). 
When bureaucracies are in addition institutions that supply health services, 
there is a dimension that is added and that is intertwined to the exercise of power 
relations: the discourse, social organization, and discipline of medicine (Foucault, 
1973; Turner, 1987). In the specificity of the exercise of their power 
administrators, health workers, and service providers count not only with the 
social and political support of the organization of bureaucracy, but additionally 
with the social and symbolic force of medical knowledge (Staum, and Larsen 
1981; Turner, 1992; Zola, 1992). In the micro-physics of institutional power, the 
combination of those two structural conditions creates and offers, at all levels, an 
incredible source of legitimacy to the exercise of power, the decisions made, and 
the actions taken by health bureaucrats. That social authority provides with a 
protective shield from social questioning or public scrutiny, and minimizes the 
emergence of resistance from the public to the actions of the health bureaucrat. 
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Additionally, it provides the bureaucrat a way of understanding his place and 
institutional participation as a cog in a complex social machine, as well as a 
rationality for evaluating his actions not only as necessary, but because they 
provide a service, also as good (Hillier, 1982; Waitzkin, 1991).  
It is also with tha t social legitimacy that service providers attend to the 
needs of the public, to the particular needs of every citizen that seeks guidance, 
advice, and solutions to their health problems. It is from this place of socially 
legitimate power that nurses and physicians listen to their patients, evaluate their 
health situation, diagnose their problems, and recommend a medical course of 
action. The exercise of this specific power is not only discretional but also 
vertical, and it expresses itself as a gaze from the heights of medical knowledge 
that looks down upon the regular lives and daily demands of patients, and that 
grants little credence to their common, popular, and not specialized knowledge 
about their bodies, needs, and decisions (Finkler, 1991; Morgan et al., 1985a and 
1985b; Waitzkin, 1991). 
The contraceptive and institutional experience with surgical methods in 
contemporary Mexico speaks to these social processes and power dynamics, as 
well as to the state of reproductive rights within the public sphere. 
In 1987, there were 2.3 million women in Mexico that were sterilized for 
contraceptive reasons. Before the surgical procedure took place, one out of four 
(26%) never received information regarding the existence and characteristics of 
other contraceptive methods, nor were they advised about the irreversible nature 
of tubal ligation. Two out of every five sterilized women (40%) were never asked 
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to sign a legal consent form, or else they were asked to sign one but was never 
read nor explained to them. One out of six women (17%) underwent a deficient 
pre-surgical medical examination or did not receive one at all. Of all sterilized 
women, four out of every five (79%) underwent their surgery in a governmental 
medical institution (Dirección General de Planificación Familiar, 1989; Figueroa, 
J.G., 1988 and 1990). 
In a study about satisfaction and dissatisfaction in contraceptive 
sterilization, Tuirán (1990) found that certain variables of the reproductive 
decision making process were crucial for explaining the leve l of satisfaction 
women had (or reported having) about being surgically sterilized. The level of 
control that women had over the decision, the quality of the administrative 
process for informing and obtaining consent, the presence or not of negative 
attitudes from their husbands towards the operation were the strongest predictors 
of the level of post-surgical satisfaction. In 1987, women in Mexico that reported 
having low control over the decision, experiencing deficient administrative 
consent procedures, and having husbands who had negative feelings towards the 
operation presented the highest levels of dissatisfaction with being surgically 
sterilized. 
Who can be sure that inside the social spaces of medical offices, clinics, 
and hospitals where crucial reproductive decisions are made and realized health 
service providers are preoccupied about responding to the demands and needs of 
women, couples, and patients in general? Who can assure us that the employees 
of medical institutions in Mexico, who are in active and constant contact with the 
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public are advising, suggesting, and prescribing thinking about the reproductive 
rights of their patients as citizens of Mexico? 
Already in 1987, the analysis of the data on sterilization in the country 
suggested a negative evaluation of the service provided by governmental medical 
institutions. Not only did they provide a deficient service to patients from a 
medical perspective, but the administrative process for assuring that women's 
election was based on an informed consent suggested important flaws and 
violations of norms and procedural standards (Figueroa, 1990; Tuirán, 1990). 
Overall, in the late eighties, surgical contraception in governmental institutions 
did not tend to develop in a context that respected the rights of women and 
allowed unrestrained exercise of their reproductive rights. 
In more recent years, the work of different non-governmental 
organizations have produced compilations of numerous testimonies of individual 
rights violations. These NGOs have been instrumental for the organization of 
women's groups, providing them with legal support and advice for launching 
public complaints and preparing law suits against public medical institutions. The 
cases are very diverse and range in the type of reproductive rights violation. From 
complaints of medical service deficiencies with health consequences to the post-
partum insertion of IUDs without the consent of women. From disrespectful 
treatment and health care negligence to non-authorized surgical sterilization. As a 
group, the 55 cases made public in 1997 cannot be linked to a single clinic, 
hospital or medical institution. The strength of their documentation, however, lies 
in the fact that they point to a pattern of diverse violations that expands across all 
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types of units, and health personnel, and that it involves all governmental 
institutions (Red de Salud de las Mujeres del D.F., 1997a). 
To those cases that largely occurred within Mexico City, we have to add 
(unfortunately) the systematic and institutionally orchestrated violation suffered 
by different groups of women, in small rural towns across the country, in the mid-
nineties.  
The most known and well-documented case happened in San Miguel 
Pocitos (state of Puebla), during the months of May and June of 1996. The story 
hit the newspapers in the middle of August. A group of women were diagnosed 
with pelvic inflammatory disease caused by the presence of IUDs, which were 
inserted in their uteruses without their consent, and during a supposedly routine 
pelvic examination by a medical mobile unit of governmental health service 
providers, that belonged to the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS). The 
case became known across the country because a congressman exposed and 
denounced it in the Chamber of Deputies, the Lower House of Mexico's 
Congress. The congressman launched a legal suit against the institution and the 
directly responsible medical personnel, on behalf of the 54 women who became 
victims of the abuse and rights violation (Red de Salud de las Mujeres del D.F., 
1997a and 1997b)10. 
"Family planning employees ... can be seen as semi-autonomous social 
units that mediate between the public world of the bureaucracy and the private 
world of sexuality and reproduction" (Tuirán, R., 1988:49). In their activities at 
                                                 
     10 Similar experiences, but with fewer cases have been reported to have occured during the first 
six months of 1997, in the states of Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Veracruz. The reports came 
from two newspapers with national circulation: La Jornada and Reforma.  
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work, and from their structural condition of salaried workers, health providers 
reproduce the institutional norms and regulations when following instructions, 
carrying-out their daily tasks and completing a work schedule. As reactive social 
agents they can resist the arbitrary forms of the bureaucratic management, and try 
to protect themselves from the delegation of responsibilities and the assignment of 
institutional blame. As public servants and in their function as providers of a 
specific service, they reproduce the intentionality of fertility control programs 
when convincing patients to become contraceptors, with the intention of fulfilling 
implicit institutional quotas. As health workers and in the daily exercise of their 
specific power they reproduce the vertical orientation of fertility control programs 
when they subordinate the needs and rights of patients, but particularly of women, 
to the rationality of institutions and medicine, and to the demands of 
quantitatively defined population goals. 
The problem, however, should not be reduced to one of good or bad will. 
The problem, I am suggesting, is not even necessarily linked to the professional 
qualifications of physicians, nurses, and social workers11. Even with the best of 
training, and the best of personal intentions health providers are embedded in 
institutional contexts with internal rules and regulations, predetermined agendas, 
and systems of control. With varying amounts of resources and differential 
powers, these health workers are embedded in bureaucratic institutions (in the 
weberian and foucaultian sense, as well) that work as organic wholes in the 
                                                 
     11 The results of a 1988 national survey revealed (Dirección General de Planificación Familiar, 
1988), for example, that the level of knowledge of health providers working for the Secretary of 
Health (SS) was deficient when compared to the minimum standards that the institution had set for 
itself. Nevertheless, the point made here is not of qualifications, but of institutional constraints 
over the actions, and the will of individual health workers. 
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pursuit of predetermined objectives, and where concepts like loyalty, 
commitment, and belonging are used as political mechanisms to create links 
between high, middle, and base level bureaucrats, and to generate institutional 
hermeticism, internal cohesion, and organizational discipline. The problem is that 
regardless of the good or bad will, of the qualifications of service providers, of the 
mistakes that individuals can make or are exposed to the risk of making, the 
structure and the system of public medical institutions in Mexico is more 
conducive and prone to establish authoritarian social relations with the public, 
than to generate social relations based on intersubjective consideration and respect 
for the needs, rights, and decisions of individual citizens. 
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Conclusion 
In this dissertation I presented and articulated the results of the study I 
conducted on the relationship between reproductive rights, and population 
policies. I did so, in three interconnected, yet distinctive parts. First, I offered an 
intervention in the contemporary theoretical debate about the need, validity, 
foundations, and universal capacity of human rights. Second, I developed an 
analytical framework for the study of reproductive rights and their relation to 
population policies, as a set of normative standards created internationally and 
translated within the context of individual nation states. Third, I used this 
framework and its analytical proposals to study the case of contemporary Mexico, 
which uniquely combines a liberal national entitlement of reproductive rights and 
a population policy that has been enforced in an authoritarian fashion. 
The current debate about human rights, that I explore in chapter one, is 
theoretically complex because it involves multiple and simultaneous realms of the 
sociological, political, legal, and philosophical. No one that believes in global 
social justice today can deny the practical-political and normative- legal 
importance of human rights for the protection of individuals, minorities, and the 
socially disadvantaged in the world. Yet, beyond this general recognition, they 
have been called into question many times and on many fronts. They have been 
characterized as legally naive and politically ineffectual for their inability to stop 
atrocities and genocides, years and decades after they were established and 
approved by the United Nations. They have been described as ethnocentric and 
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deemed to work as instruments of domination of the West over the rest of the 
world, rather than protecting and allowing the empowerment of people around the 
globe. 
But, even among those that are largely sympathetic to the spirit and 
intentions of the international charter, there are many that see no reason for 
engaging theoretical reflection about human rights, and call instead for practical 
approaches, and for political solutions. 
While identifying universality and foundations as two global fundamental 
issues to be explored and debated, I have contended, however, that theorizing 
about human rights is not only useful but actually indispensable. Practical 
agreements are for the actualization of rights, no doubt, crucial. But alone, they do 
not provide with the guidance that is required in moments of paradigmatic crises. 
The difficulties of engaging the debate about universality and foundations 
should not dissuade us away from it. The question of how to intervene in these 
debates without falling into essentialist traps, is not an easy riddle to solve. I have 
not suggested nor presented a way to resolve the problems regarding universality 
and foundations. From some perspectives this might be seen as a limitation of the 
exploration presented here. And in some sense it is. 
I suggest, however, that discourse ethics represents a solid and interesting 
approach capable of offering some solutions to these problems, because it is 
concerned simultaneously about issues of content, and on the conditions under 
which these substantive discussions happen. Discourse ethics, I believe, provides 
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for mechanisms of avoiding essentialist positions, while allowing for substantive 
interventions. 
In chapter two, I developed a series of arguments and put forward some 
theoretical elaborations with the intention of offering a sociological framework 
for the analysis of the reproductive rights in their different social, political and 
legal dimensions, both at an international level and within specific national 
contexts. 
Using Habermas' "ideal speech situation", I reconstructed the "ideal 
reproductive decision-making process", informed both by human rights standards 
of social justice, and feminist theory. This ideal normative reconstruction 
identifies the process of making autonomous, unrestricted, and informed 
decisions, both in the private and the public sphere, as the center of the exercise of 
reproductive rights. 
Once I established the ideal normative, my analysis turned to the factors 
that might impede the full realization of these rights. Within the contexts of nation 
states, I find two sources of disturbances: power relations and social inequality. 
Both power and inequality create profound distortions to the decision making 
process in the private, as well as in the public domain. 
From a cognitive point of view, the object is to contribute to the expansion 
and development of this field of study, as well as to participate in the 
consolidation of an emergent academic community interested in studying 
population policies from a critique of power relations. 
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From a political point of view, the proposal seeks to offer some analytical 
guidelines to civil organizations that work in favor of the protection and defense 
of reproductive rights and on the generation of processes that can empower 
individual citizens and groups. 
This analytical framework was applied, in chapter three, to the case of 
contemporary Mexico. 
With the approval of the General Law of Population in 1973, Mexico 
experienced a paradigmatic change in the state's orientation and perception of the 
relation between development and population growth. The size and distribution of 
the population was no longer seen as a necessary condition for the consolidation 
of the nation. Instead, following neo-Malthusian interpretations, population 
growth was regarded as a major obstacle to social and economic development, 
and as an impediment for modernizing the country. 
This legal initiative, that came from the executive branch of government 
and was fully endorsed by the legislative, established the current content and 
orientation of population policies at the same time that it defined reproductive 
rights in Mexico. 
The importance of fertility in determining the rates of population growth 
in the latter part of the 20th century, made the control of fertility the main goal of 
population policies efforts. In effect, with the launching of the National Family 
Planning Program in the mid-seventies governmental medical institutions became 
responsible for enacting fertility control policies and for achieving programmatic 
goals of growth.  
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The impact of these policies from the seventies through the nineties has 
been significant. In the span of three decades, fertility levels have been reduced in 
more than half, and contraceptive use has more than doubled. 
To what extent have these policy and demographic changes occurred 
following what the own General Law of Population defines as inalienable 
reproductive rights? Using available data from national surveys, and a 
reconstruction of the institutional process of policy design and implementation, I 
examine the situation of reproductive rights in the public domain of medical 
institutions. 
The data from demographic and contraceptive prevalence surveys, suggest 
that violations of reproductive rights have occurred in Mexico within public 
medical institutions.  
Data provided by a national fertility survey in 1987, allowed the 
evaluation of medical services, administrative procedures, and reproductive 
decisions for women that had undergone surgical sterilization. Significant 
proportions of women experienced deficient medical services and violations of 
the procedural codes for assuring informed consent. Throughout the nineties, 
reports and testimonies compiled by non-governmental organizations (that were 
publicly denounced and legally pursued) have also documented rights violations 
in surgical and other forms of contraception, such as IUDs.  Additional cases of 
groups of women in small rural towns, in 1996 and 1997, revealed further 
violations and institutional practices of organized deceit. 
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While I found no evidence to support the claim that the violations have 
been massive, there is enough data to argue that they have been, however, 
systematic. In other words, the data suggest that these violations are not just 
clusters of mistakes in the provision of services or a series of random events 
product of individual cases of medical negligence. They suggest patterns of 
institutional disregard. 
The establishment of population growth goals, and their bureaucratic 
translation into fertility and contraceptive targets is problematic for reproductive 
rights in Mexico. Alone, they cannot be blamed for the violation of reproductive 
rights. However, the implementation of aggressive family planning programs with 
instrumental objectives, and under the responsibility of medical bureaucracies has 
resulted in the formation of a public space more conducive to authoritarian 
practices that violate rights, than to one that respects and fosters the unrestrained 
exercise of reproductive rights.  
Perhaps we can accuse administrative elites of allowing aggressive family 
planning programs that have been a threat to reproductive self-determination. We 
might also accuse them of dismissing and ignoring claims when violations were 
perpetrated, and of not being responsive to complaints and protests. We can 
charge the government for not listening to critiques from civil associations and 
feminist organizations that have been constantly denouncing zealous institutions 
and physicians that curtail reproductive freedom and choices. But, I find no 
evidence to suggest that a national campaign to control fertility was launched and 
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implemented knowing that it would violate reproductive rights and trample the 
will of individual citizens. 
Further examination and research on the situation of reproductive rights in 
Mexico, is required. For this, however, there is need of more and different kind of 
data. On the one hand, there is an urgent need for comprehensive data on the 
institutional practices of service provision, and on the level of compliance to rules 
and procedures that protect autonomous reproductive decisions. On the other, 
there is a serious need for qualitative research and case studies examining the 
decision-making processes both in the private and in the public realm, and by 
studying the effects of social inequality. 
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Chart 1: Process of Human Reproduction 
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Chart 2: Rights Within Nations
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Chart 3: Ideal Reproductive Decision-Making Process
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Chart 
4: Disturbances in the Ideal Decision-Making Process
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Table 1: Contraceptive Prevalence Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age 
By Selected Characteristics. Mexico, 1976-1997 
        
Prevalence 1976 1979 1982 1987 1992 1995 1997 
        
By Type of Method        
Modern Methods 23.1 32.0 41.5 44.8 55.0 57.5 59.2 
Any Method 30.2 37.8 47.7 52.7 63.1 66.5 68.5 
        
By Age Groups        
15 - 19 14.2 19.2 20.8 30.2 36.4 36.1 45.0 
20 - 24 26.7 37.4 45.7 46.9 55.4 57.1 59.3 
25 - 29 38.6 44.5 56.5 54.0 65.7 67.7 67.8 
30 - 34 38.0 49.6 59.8 62.3 70.1 75.2 75.4 
35 - 39 37.9 42.8 57.6 61.3 72.6 78.8 76.1 
40 - 44 25.1 33.3 42.9 60.2 67.4 70.8 74.5 
45 - 49 11.8 16.3 22.1 34.2 50.5 53.1 61.4 
        
By Number of Children        
None 6.5 8.3 12.6 15.3 20.7 17.5 23.9 
One 27.2 28.8 34.4 50.5 56.6 59.2 59.8 
Two 39.1 42.8 51.9 60.0 71.0 77.3 75.4 
Three 38.4 42.9 54.0 67.5 75.0 72.0 80.6 
Four and more 29.6 36.2 46.1 51.3 62.6 70.3 70.4 
        
By Place of Residence        
Rural 13.7 27.4 29.8 32.5 44.6 52.7 53.6 
Urban 42.1 45.2 57.8 61.5 70.1 71.3 73.3 
        
By Formal Education        
No Schooling 12.8 20.3 32.6 23.7 38.2 48.4 48.0 
Incomplete Elementary 25.5 32.0 42.9 44.8 56.4 58.2 61.3 
Complete Elementary 40.3 49.6 51.2 62.0 66.7 67.8 69.8 
Junior High or more 55.8 59.0 61.7 69.9 73.6 73.3 74.8 
        
Source: EMF 1976, ENPUA 1979, END 1982, ENFES 1987, ENADID 1992 & 1997,  
ENPF 1995, CONAPO 1999. For complete references see footnote 8.  
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Table 2: Contraceptive Knowledge: Percentage of Women, 15-49 Years of Age, 
That Know at Least One Contraceptive By Selected Characteristics. 
Mexico, 1976-1997 
       
 1976 1979 1987 1992 1995 1997 
       
Total 89.0 85.9 92.9 94.9 93.1 96.6 
       
Groups of Age       
15 - 19 79.8 73.6 89.8 90.9 86.4 93.4 
20 - 24 88.8 88.4 94.0 96.1 95.2 96.8 
25 - 29 93.1 91.7 95.2 97.1 96.0 98.1 
30 - 34 91.3 92.0 94.3 97.5 95.6 97.9 
35 - 39 89.7 90.4 92.6 95.9 97.7 97.3 
40 - 44 86.1 87.7 93.3 95.4 92.9 97.4 
45 - 49 85.9 86.6 92.5 93.1 87.9 95.7 
       
Number of Children       
None 86.6 76.5 91.3 92.5 89.1 94.0 
One 89.7 90.0 94.3 96.7 94.2 98.2 
Two 91.8 91.9 95.5 97.8 97.7 99.0 
Three 91.3 91.8 95.2 97.6 95.4 98.8 
Four and more 88.6 90.2 92.4 94.7 94.4 96.5 
       
Formal Education       
No Schooling 73.7 75.0 72.9 79.5 75.5 82.3 
Incomplete Elementary 88.9 82.2 90.3 92.7 91.3 93.7 
Complete Elementary 95.6 89.2 95.4 95.1 91.4 95.8 
Junior High and more 99.1 95.1 98.9 98.7 96.7 99.3 
       
Place of Residence       
Rural 78.6 73.8 83.1 86.5 85.7 90.0 
Urban 95.8 92.5 96.4 97.7 95.6 98.4 
       
Source: EMF 1976, ENPUA 1979, ENFES 1987, ENADID 1992 & 1997, 
ENPF 1995, CONAPO 1999. For complete references see footnote 8. 
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Table 3: Fertilty Rates: Age Specific and Total. Mexico, 1965 - 1995 
        
 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Age Groups        
15 - 19 140 126 105 106 89 81 72 
20 - 24 315 306 276 203 202 178 155 
25 - 29 340 326 269 211 203 169 153 
30 - 34 275 279 231 172 142 120 108 
35 - 39 226 196 173 122 106 75 61 
40 - 44 115 115 74 43 35 21 23 
        
Total Fertility Rate 7.1 6.7 5.6 4.3 3.9 3.2 2.9 
        
Source: EMF 1976, END 1982, ENFES 1987, ENADID 1992, ENPF 1995,   




Table 4: Total Fertility Rates By Place of Residence: Rural and Urban. Mexico, 
1974-1999 
      
 1974 1980 1985 1990 1996 
Place of Residence      
Rural 7.4 6.8 6.0 4.8 3.5 
Urban 5.0 4.0 3.3 2.9 2.3 
      
Source: EMF 1976, END 1982, ENFES 1987, ENADID 1992 & 1997, 
ENPF 1995, CONAPO 1999. For complete references see footnote 8. 
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Table 5: Total Fertility Rates By Formal Education. Mexico, 1974-1999 
      
 1974 1980 1985 1990 1996 
Formal Education      
No Schooling 7.8 6.9 6.2 5.0 4.7 
Incomplete Elementary 7.0 5.9 5.3 4.5 3.7 
Complete Elementary 4.9 4.0 3.9 3.4 3.1 
Junior High and More 3.5 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.2 
      
Source: EMF 1976, END 1982, ENFES 1987, ENADID 1992 & 1997, 




Table 6: Total Fertility Rates By Labor Market Participation. Mexico, 1974-1999 
      
 1974 1980 1985 1990 1996 
Labor Market Particiaption      
Participates 3.8 3.6 2.8 2.2 2.0 
Does Not Participate 6.9 5.4 4.7 4.0 3.4 
      
Source: EMF 1976, END 1982, ENFES 1987, ENADID 1992 & 1997, 
ENPF 1995, CONAPO 1999. For complete references see footnote 8. 
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Table 7: Total Fertility Rates By Labor Market Participation and Place of 
Residence: Rural and Urban. Mexico, 1974-1999 
      
 1974 1980 1985 1990 1996 
Labor Market Participation      
Rural Place of Residence      
Participates 5.5 5.5 5.0 4.0 2.8 
Does Not Paticipate 7.8 7.2 6.3 5.0 3.9 
      
Labor Market Particiaption      
Urban Place of Residence      
Participates 3.0 2.7 2.3 1.9 1.7 
Does Not Paticipate 5.9 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.0 
      
Source: EMF 1976, END 1982, ENFES 1987, ENADID 1992 & 1997, 
ENPF 1995, CONAPO 1999. For complete references see footnote 8. 
 
 
Table 8: Contraceptive Usage Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age, By 
Type of Method Used. Mexico, 1976-1997 
        
 1976 1979 1982 1987 1992 1995 1997 
Method Used        
The Pill 35.9 33.0 29.7 18.2 15.3 12.7 10.2 
IUD 18.7 16.1 13.8 19.4 17.7 22.3 20.8 
Female Operation 8.9 23.5 28.1 36.2 43.3 41.4 44.7 
Male Operation 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.5 1.4 0.9 1.8 
Injections 5.6 6.7 10.6 5.3 5.1 4.6 4.6 
Condoms, Jellies & Foams 7.0 5.0 4.1 4.7 5.0 5.0 5.7 
Traditional Methods 23.3 15.1 13.0 14.7 12.2 13.1 12.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
        
Source: EMF 1976, ENPUA 1979, END 1982, ENFES 1987, ENADID 1992 & 1997, . 
ENPF 1995, CONAPO 1999. For complete references see footnote 8.   
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Table 9: Modern Method Contraceptive Usage Among Women, 15 through 49 
Years of Age, By Institutional Source. Mexico, 1976-1997 
       
 1979 1982 1987 1992 1995 1997 
       
Public Institution 51.1 53.4 61.9 66.6 71.3 72.5 
IMSS 27.9 32.3 37.5 41.4 44.3 41.6 
ISSSTE 3.9 4.9 5.4 4.3 3.6 4.6 
SSA 14.7 14.5 15.5 15.0 16.5 19.6 
Other Public 4.6 1.7 3.5 5.9 6.9 6.8 
       
Private Institution 48.9 46.6 38.1 33.4 28.7 27.5 
Pharmacy 31.3 31.3 21.9 18.6 15.8 13.8 
Medical Office 15.4 14.2 14.3 14.1 12.2 13.6 
Other Private 2.2 1.1 1.9 0.7 0.7 0.2 
       
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
       
Source: ENPUA 1979, END 1982, ENFES 1987, ENADID 1992 & 1997, 
ENPF 1995, CONAPO 1999. For complete references see footnote 8. 
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Graph 1: Contraceptive Prevalence By Type of Method Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age. Mexico,1976-
1997
Graph 1: Contraceptive Prevalence  By Type of Method 
Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age. 
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Graph 2: Contraceptive Prevalence By Age Groups Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age.Mexico, 
1976-1997
Graph 2: Contraceptive Prevalence By Age Groups
Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age.
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Graph 3: Contraceptive Prevalence By Number of Children Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of 
Age.Mexico, 1976-1997
Graph 3: Contraceptive Prevalence By Number of Children
Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age.
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Graph 4: Contraceptive Prevalence By Place of Residence Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age. 
Mexico, 1976-1997
Graph 4: Contraceptive Prevalence By Place of Residence
Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age. 



















Graph 5: Contraceptive Prevalence By Formal Education Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age. 
Mexico, 1976-1997
Graph 5: Contraceptive Prevalence By Formal Education
Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age. 
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Graph 6: Total Fertility Rate. Mexico, 1965-1995
Graph 6: Total Fertility Rate.



















































Graph 7: Age Specific Fertility Rates (15-45). 
Mexico, 1965-1995 (Source: Table 3)
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Graph 8: Age Specific Fertility Rates (15-45). Mexico, 1965-1995
Graph 8: Age Specific Fertility Rates (15-45).
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Graph 9: Total Fertility Rates By Place of Residence 
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 Mexico, 1974-1996 (Source: Table 4)
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Graph 10: Total Fertility Rates By Formal Education.
Mexico, 1974-1996 (Source: Table 5)
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Mexico, 1974-1996 (Source: Table 6)
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Graph 12: Contraceptive Usage Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age, By Type of Method Used. 
Mexico, 1976-1997
Graph 12: Contraceptive Usage Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age, 
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Graph 13: Contraceptive Usage Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age, 
By General Institutional Source. Mexico, 1976-1997 (Source: Table 9)
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Graph 14: Contraceptive Usage Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age, By Specific Institutional 
Source. Mexico, 1976-1997
Graph 14: Contraceptive Usage Among Married Women, 15-49 Years of Age, 
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